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.ABSTRAOT 
The Liberation of France in 1941t. was the occasion for the emergenoe 
of a new Ohristian Democratio party in the form of a mass movement. 
This grouping, called the Mouvement Republioain Populaire, drew its 
support from mal\V souroes and, beoause of the diversity of its eleotorate 
and beoause it was on the left politioally, even though it was the 
"Catholio" party, it. was open to ohallenges from both politioal extremes. 
The MRP was one of the four centre groups that, from 1947 on, provided 
the govemmentso However, these groups, although forced to live 
together, were unable to become united and provide a stable majority 
coalition governmento Nor oould they oall upon the nation to provide 
them with wide powers as not onJ.y was it against their own prinoiples, 
but also the populaoe preferred the government to be weak. During the 
post-war years to 1952 a struggle coulcil be observed as the oentre parties 
attempted to remain in control together and yet to put their own 
individual programnes into effeot. Eventual1\1, in 1951, an eleotoral 
law was passed that ensured, at least for the moment; their oontinued 
survivGa. as the makers of governments. It did nothing, however, to 
ensure that the oentre parties would cooperate, and they split, leaving 
the W8'3 open for a swing to the right which, although on1\1 temporary, 
was a portent of things to oane and a hint as to the general temper of 
the country. Probably the party that suffered the most as a result 
of developments during these years was the :MRP whioh lost its oontrol-
ling position.as l.1D1pire and was relegated to the benoh as one of the 
plqers. 
2. 
CHAPTER I 
--
THE Mm? .AND. THE EARLY FOORTH REPUBLIC 
In 1947 the MRP tisplqed an intent to remain politically on the 
left by resisting the appeal of General de Gaulle. At the time this 
cost them most of their comervative following and gave greater weight 
to their world.ng class rank and file. The Mouvemen t Republicain 
Populaire attempted to appear not as a "class" party, however, but rather 
as a. movement serving all groups in Franoe, henoe the s ignifioanoe of its 
name. It was diffioult for the MRP to be a 'mouvement' in 8l'\Ything 
but name, however, as its geographioal centres of strength were so 
limited that proper contact with all groups in Franoe was out of the 
question. Nor could the party suooesst'ulq defend its claim to be 
free fran olass allegiance as even a oursory glanoe would reveal that 
the party was primarily confined to a social milieu that might best be 
desoribed as that portion of Frenoh lower middle 0 lass oomposed of 
practising Oatholios. To the detriment of party membership the :MRP 
was not conservative enough in poli tioal, eoonanic and sooial matters to 
satisty most of the upper class or the grande bourgeoisie in the oities, 
most of whom were closel;y conneoted with business, On the other hand 
the MRP was too oonservative to draw the bulk of its support from the 
lower class. The overall poli tioal tendency of the MRP was towards 
conservatism and as the years passed it found itself foroed it13reasingl;y 
into a more conservative role, replacing· , in its local strongholds, the 
moderate or cOnservative parties of the Third Republic. It found 
itself forced to do this as its eleotoral base started to fr~ent as 
the war years retreated into the past and as new political movements 
arose that proved more attractive to Dl8.tlY of the newer supporters of 
the latest Christian Democratic party. "The Resistance provided :MRP 
with prestige and a party 'lite, but MRP's Resistance background was not 
an unmixed blessing. }l8l\Y Oonservatives and moderates got on to the 
bandwagon in 1945-46. Their own parties had been disoredi ted by their 
Vicqy connections, and they voted MRP not beoause they wanted a 'new 
Franoe' with greater economic and, social justioe, but because they 
wanted to olear their oonsoiences or beoause they were anti-Oomnnmist. 
They were with, but not of, MRP. Like the Gaullists, who wrongly 
assumed thatrle parti de 10. Fidelite'would play follow-l1\Y-leader to the 
General whatever the oiroumstance~ most left MRP in 1947. The 
desertion of MRP by these groups weakened the party numerioally, but, 
like the Oatholio Ohurch after the Oounter-Reformation, MRP emerged 
smaller but more united. Nevertheless, it is arguable that this early 
over-inflation did more harm than good. The party's organization was 
stretched to the limit, too man.y ear13 deputies lacked politioal experi-
ence, and when the desertions oame, the militants were more depressed 
than they might otherwise have been. II 1 
On the 7 September 1948 the insecure oabinet of Robert Sohuman, 
who had been narrowly e leoted to a seoond premiership and. who had ohos en 
the only Socialist Minister of Finanoe between 1946 and 1956, Christian 
Pineau, was overthrown after a two da3 tenure - his first had luted only 
four dqs. Finally, threeda.Ys later Henri Queuille, a Radioal leader 
fran pre-war da.Ys, was elected prime minister. "The signifioance of 
this long ministerial crisis was great though negative. In terms of 
measures it proved the impraotioabili ty of an;y olear-out orientation of 
pOlicy, whether Right or Left, and in terms both of men and of oonstit-
utional methods it seemed for a time to mark the triumph of the defunot 
Third Republio over tb4 upstart Fourth. At the Liberation new leaders 
had replaced the disoredited seniors; but soon the old politicians were 
recalled. None of the first three premiers had held office before the 
war; four of the next five had done so.... The events of August and 
September 194~defined an equilibrilml of farces which 'Vas to last for 
three years. The older leaders and groups regained a share in power 
but not a monopo13 or even a preponderance; the constitutional pendulum 
1 R. E. M. Irving, Ohristian Democracy in France, pp.77-78. 
swung half-way baok to the Third Republio. The failures of Reynaud 
and Pineau shewed that no wholehearted policy, Oonservative or Socialist 
oould oommand the support of the Assembly. The oentre parties were 
'oondemned. to live together' in compranise and frustrationo" 2 
This was in effect the major obstacle to the oreation of stable 
governments. The eleotorate insisted on electing oandidates from a 
large number of diverse politioal groupings. This was particularly 
the oase after the united rule of the 3 large po1itioa1 parties, known 
as tripartisme., disintegrated in 1947. 
This new era of Frenoh politioal history started under the guidanoe 
of the equanimous Henri Queui1le who apparently had as one of his major 
aims the goal of ensuring that ministerial crises oou1d occur without 
The threat to the regime posed by these 
orises was implicit rather than explioit in that the publio tended to 
lose confidence in the politioal leadership that was and the system in 
general. This loss of confidenoe was something that was vitally 
important for the men of the centre to avoid as in times of stress 
polarization of poli tioa1 opinion oooured and groupings such as the 
Frenoh Oonmunist Party (POl') and de Gaul1e's right-wing Rassemblement 
au Peuple F:ran~ais (the RPF was founded in 1947 in response to just suoh 
a demand) reoeived the support that was so badq needed. by the oentre 
parties. A more stable politioal olimate was needed therefore so that 
the transfer of power tram one Government to another oou1d ooourwithout 
. 
the regime and the po1itioal asoenianqy of the oentre being endangered. 
This was the ~i tuation that Queuil1e sought to oreate. He suoceeded 
and was able to resign in safety on the 5th of October 1949. There 
followed several attempts to fom governments before the :MRP saw its 
opportunity and, taking advantage of the publio' s growing impatienoe with 
the ever biokering politioians, Bicia.u1t refused to oonfront the Assembly 
until the parties had aooepted his oabinet; the Assembly, almost 
2 P. M. Williams, Orisis and Oanpromise, pp.35-36. 
;,. 
exasperated with itselttagreed to Bidault's oabinet. Thus a new 
government was installed to taoe the old problems, and in particular that 
ot tinanoe and the budget, an issue whioh almost lead to the ministry's 
deteat in Deoember. In Februar,y the Socialists resigned over the wages 
polioy, and tour months later they turned Bidault out over the salaries 
ot oivil servants, many ot whom were Sooialist voters. The orisis of' 
J1une - Ju~ 19;0, after the tall of Bidault/ sh~d that the political 
balanoe had changed little in the previous two years. "Trois 
iouvemements se sont suoo~a.esen dix-huit mois et les trois crises ant 
d~ a elles seules p~s de deux mois. Il a ~t' prouve qu'on ne 
pouvait iouverner ni avec ni sans les socialistes. En tai~ la rupture 
entre eux et les autres partis est moralement aoquise ~s la ohute du 
premier minist.re Queuille qu t ils Ght provoqu6 ~ l' autonne 1949. Oe 
divorce politique est uae consequenoe lointaine mais certaine au d$part 
des communistes. De moins en mow les socialistes se sentent a 
l' aise dans une majori t$ ~ les mOd$ris et les liberaux comptent et 
"-pesent de plus en plus. Quand la gauohe pausse son av.antage, c'est 
la droi te qui se retire ou inversement. 
impossible ou suppose l' immobiliSO\e. II 3 
La cohabitation devient 
In etfect a form of stalemate 
had been reachedo TAere was considerable bickering and maJ\V' issues 
lead to serious quarrels; a.n4 yet effective control of the government 
remained with the same parties· of the • centre' , the MRP, the Socialists 
ana. the Radicals, in sane form of coalition or other. The approaching 
general election in 19;1 made coalitions even hal:-der to maintain. 
Mistrust between the Socialists and the MRP had persisted since the 
tonner lett the Bidault government, and worsened in November when 
several :MRP deputies voted to impeach the Socialist leader, Jules Mocb, 
the minister ot defence and principal oolleague ot the leader of' the new 
ministry, Rene Pleven. Moreover the oontlict over economio policy 
broke out again, Socialists and the :MRP advooating industrial subsidies, 
3 J o Fauvet, La IVe R$publique, pp. 16;-166. 
6. 
and the Radioals and Oonservatives opposirlg them. The most serious 
oonflict of all, however, was that over eleotoral law reform. When 
~'tueuille oame to power in March 19.51 he deoided that, in order to 
minimize the ravages ot electoral fever and to attempt to hold political 
Frano:e together, it waa necessary to hold the eleotions in June, tour 
months early. As no eleotoral retorm oould pass without the oonsent ot 
the MRP, he persuaded his Radioal. oolleagues to gi va w~, and the new 
eleotoral law and the budget were passed just in time tor the eJ.eotions 
ot 17 June. The electoral law allowed 'national' parties, that is, 
those parties oontesting the election in at least thirty ~partements. 
to a.ll1 with one another and to pool their votes. .An element of 
propmional representation had been introduoed but in suoh oiroumstanoes 
that this could onl3 serve to beneti t the tour parties ot the r~g1Jne, 
the JdRP, .the SOCialists, the Radioal.s and the Oonserv,atives, as the 
other two major parties of the dq were unwilling to al~ themselves to 
any other ol'l8l'lizations and this cost them seats. Oonsequentl3, the 
tour parties ot the regime gained a narrow popular majority. However, 
these tour parties were divided over the social refo:r:ms of the Liberation 
- whioh were still approved by a majority ot voters, in particular by 
those who supported the Oomnunists, the Socialists, the :MRP and sane ot 
the RET's (de Gaulle's party) supporters - and over the question ot 
churoh schools and whether or not aid should be given to them. The 
balance in the eleotorate was now very olose indeed with regard to this 
issue. As the Socialists were eager to esoape taking responsibility 
tor the polio1:es ot others, the RPF was able to achieve a OOOll'08l1ding 
position by widening the breach between them and their former partners. 
It did so by using the olerioal question to divide the centre parties in 
much the same way as the Oommunists bad done six years before. In 
effeot, the RPF made a bid for a portion of the MeP's following by its 
outspoken statements in tavour or state aid for ohuroh sohools. This 
forced the parliamentary wing of the MRP to support the oall for aid, as 
" expressed in the Loi Barauge, against their own wishes because otherwise 
they stood to lose their more conservative supporters and this would have 
ettectively crippled the MRP. "In a real sense the schooh question 
was the test for Christian Democracy in France. It progressive 
Oatholics and moderate Socialists could get over this hurdle, it might 
be possible to develop a non-sectarian party ot refonn - like the 
British Labour Party. It not Oatholics would be under increasing 
pressure to return to their tradi tionaJ. place on the right wing of the 
politioal speot~" 4 The schools qu~stion remained as a blight 
Upon the Fi"ench political landscape; so much so in tact, that it ma;y be 
regarded as one of the chiet reasons for the limited success ot Ohristian 
Democracy in France. 
The KRP's conneotions with Catholioism, as with its Resistance 
inheri tance both helped ana hindered the party. Unlike the German 
Christlioh Demokratische Union, the MRP made very little :impression on 
the non-catholio electorate. The post-war Oatholic revival, the 
strength of Oatholio Action and the broad support of the Oatholic trade 
union tederation, the OFTO, generally Denefited the MRP whereas, from 
almost every other point of' view the party's failure to rid itself of a 
t con:f'essional' :image was a disadvantage. Above all it resulted in the 
MRP becoming almost entirely a regional party, in contrast to both the 
German ODU and the Italian Demoorazia Ohristiana. In spite of the 
existence of the Peasant Party, the MRP was in a very real sense the 
farmers' party. It was therefore natural that the Ohristian Democrats 
should be deeply involved in agricultural politiCS, both in government 
and through their rural orsan1zations. The MRPts e.s;ricu1turalpolioy 
was neither collectivist nor individualist. The party favoured the 
continuation of peasant fannirlg but, unlike the Oommunists, did not 
llmi t itself' <>nl3 to the clefenee of the small tarmer. In the Fourth 
4 R. E. l4. Irving, Ohris t ian Democracy in France, p. 21 • 
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RepUblio approximate~ one-seventh of the MRP's deputies were farmers. 
At the 1951 party Congress it was olaimed that 15% of the MRP's members 
were farmers. whilst in 1960 the figure was put at 22;&. This 
growth coinoided with the growth of the J eunesse Agricola Chr"etiel'lneo 
The proportion of MRP rural members and deputies also 1nevitab~ rose 
as the party was pushed haole into agricultural (and Catholio) strong-
holds such as Brittaqy. 
In his book Georges Bidault wrote. conoerning the MRP, "I think 
the party's outlook was too narrON, too preoccupied with social 
prGblems - an a.clmirable attitude. but one whioh left the MRP blind to 
the true perils of Ocmmunism for a very long time. It 5 It was a 
pi ty that he compromised himself over the Algerian question and conse-
quent~ t.el't obliged to deffmd his position. Nonetheless it is true 
that the MRP was very interested in social problems, even if solutions 
were neither read1~ at hand nor, when they were aVailable, easi~ 
legislated. 
The MRP originated GUtsiCle pol! tics in the narrow sense. of the 
word. It emerged fran the ~cs of the Resistance and, in part, 
the form it took was detenn1ned by the Church's influence. However. 
the MRP would not have known. its extraordinar,y develo,pment and its 
success would have been ephemeral if movements with the same ideas had 
not existed before it, and especial~ if the Ohurch in 19}9 had not 
multiplied the popular .groups which extenc1led its ascendancy over a 
part of French yGutb. From 19}0 to the War, everything happened as 
if a plan had, been foxmulated to prepare the cadres for a great French 
Oatholic party, or at least to make Jruch a party possible. 
Nonetheless, in spite of this background, or, perhaps because of it, 
"it was the :MRP that, in 1944, took the o~ effective step ventured 
by any Resistance group to transform itsel1' into a political part Yo 
The leac1lers of the :MRP believed that the Oamnmist Party should not be 
allowed to stand as the only poli tioal revolutionary movement in Franoeo 
5 G. Bidault, Resistanoe, P.109. 
A vacuum had been created by the ~rtia of other former political 
groups in France, and the MRP stepped into that vacuum. 1t 6 The 
MRP was the tirst political party ot Oatho1ic inspiration in France not 
to arouse the sworm hostility of the W'ques. The :future good 
relations between the MRP and French liberals or social democrats 
(under whatever party label they might appear) depended on the MRP 
maintaining a certain non-oontessiona1 oharaoter, although, as over the 
Loi Barang~, it was sometimes necessary tor the party to admit its 
re1igiCNS ties and vote 8.Coording13 in order to protect i tselt. The 
problem consisted in the ditficulty ot reconciling cooperation with the 
18jy parties - this was necessary as otherwise the group of centrist 
parties, mown as the • troisi" toree', would not have had the strength 
to resist the che.l1enges fran the extremes - with a oontinued appeal 
to its e1eotorate,whioh had a certain clerical character. The 
leaders ot the MRP were important to the general direction that the 
movement took. "Of course it is possible tor a party with onl3' 
regional strength and. wi th a conservative, nationally minded electorate 
! 
to prosecute an internationalist policy if it has leaders with a degree 
of political prestige who are themselves intemational13 minded. 
Pf11mlin and Sohuman of the MRP, oaDing as they do from the border 
provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, were internationally minded, but 
Schuman did not have eno\1gh political influence within the Frenoh par1ia-
mento Teitgen, a perennial President of the party, owed his allegianoe 
to the conservative, c1erioal voters of Bri tta:ny. De Menthon came 
from the mountainous department of Haute-8avoie, and Bidau1t from Haute-
Loire, almost the geographical centre of Franoe. These two leaders, 
espeoiall3 Bidault, had considerable political prestige. But just 
as American isolationism in the past has been predc::minant13 located in 
6 R. B. Oape1le, The MRP and French Foreign Policy, P.10. 
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the Middle-West, so also is nationalism espeoially strong in the moun ... 
tainous departments of Franoe like Haute...Savoie or in oentrally located 
departments like Haute-Loire. It was Bidault who removed himself from 
the MRP after 1958 because of his extremely nationalistio approaoh to 
the Algerian question. It 7 
The Christian Democratic doctrine of the MRP has often been used 
as an alternative to OODmlW'list theory, particularly in these, the 
earlier years of the Fourth Republio, instead of simply as a justifioation 
for some form of Western democracyo The MRP leaders seem to have been 
stimulated by their religious background to find a positive alternative 
to Marx which would reconcile his progressive sooial thoughts with a 
more sympathetio, attitude towarda religion. Ideological factors 
were important in the :MRP - a great deal of its strength came from 
people who believed that it embodied the best traditions of Ohristian 
Democracy. Liberal Oatholioism , social Oatholioism, and Ohristian 
Democracy, in faot all shades of Oatholio opinion short of integrisme 
oGUld find a home wi thin the ranks of the MRP. The notion of a 
catholio citizen brought in its train two oomplementar,y requ~rements: 
the refusal to beoaDe isolated, and action against established struotures 
and institutionso tiLes deux exigenoes aboutissent au Me r6sultat. 
Le oatholicisme fran~ais se trouve amen~ a\ refuser l' ordre /etabli paroe 
que oet ordre oomprend trop d'injustice. Parler d'ordre a' 'tablir 
plutiJ't que d'ordre tt preserver ne revient pas seulement Ii. se situer du 
C&t' au lDO\lVeDlent OU si l' Gn prif~re, de la gauche. Ceoi abouti t 
neoessairement'a. un refus de la notion de oivilisation cm-etienne." 8 
Both this view and that whioh it opposed (that an individual should be 
politioall\Y, eOOl'l.Olllioally and socially isolated, that there be, in other 
words, a seroi...aegregated sooiety), were represented wi thin the MRP, henoe 
. Jl1a.1'\Y of its diffioul ties. ' If the MRP had to oonfine itself to the 
7 R. B. Oapelle, The MRP and Frenoh Foreign Polioy, pp. 12-13. 
8 A. Grosser, La IVe R6publiquo et sa politique exterieure, P.18l,. .. 
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Oatholic eleotorate for the vast majority of its support, it found this 
eleotorate somewhat fiokle. At this time nearly eighty-five percent 
of the population could be olassified as Oatholio beoause of their baclc-
ground. However, onq eighteen percent of the population were 
actually 'f1o.8les', although this did not preolude many of the others 
being either "pratig\U\nts" at a somewhat lower key or "oroyantso II 
Yet in 1951 the MRP reoeived only 12% of the votes oast, and it was a 
large turnouto There is some justifioation for the assertion that 
praotis·ing Ohristians in Franoe were less attached to their Ohristian 
Democratio party (in its broadest sense) than those in other European 
oountries. Yet the MRP, of all the major FrellOh parties, would most 
probab1y have had the most balanoed representation of all olasses or 
FOups, at least during its early years. On all levels of its 
organization, the MRP inoluded speoialized teams of end for workers, 
agriculture, youth, oadres and liberal professions, wanen, overseas 
groups and eleoted munioipal offioials. 
their counterparts in Oatholio Action. 
All but the last two had 
Most of these teams were 
rather unimportant to the funotioning and reorui tment of the MRP, 
probabl3' they were retained in order to keep unoffioial ties with 
Oatholio Action. However, the rural team was an exoeption: it 
f'um:lshed a substantial number of MRP members and deputies and worked to 
extend the MRP into new areas of Franoe. 
The question as to what degree the politioal stanoes of the MRP 
were affeoted by the Ohurch was brought to the fore by the ohuroh 
sohools problems in particular, but,ot oourse, did not stop there. 
"For the MRP the sohool problem was oonsidered in a religious oontext 
as well as within a more pragmatio framework. .An offioial MRP 
broohure, widel;y distributed before the 1951 eleotion, proclaimed that 
" ••• 
sohool liberty, olosely tied to religious liberty, must be effeot-
ive, not on1;y for the privileged rioh, but also f., the poorest families." 
Finally, some Oatholio tenets made it praotioal1;y impossible for the MRP 
to approve oertain polioies, while others s t:lmulated it to favour ethel:' 
polioies. 
The MRP would be very hard-pressed to favour a law liberalizing divorce 
or birth-control practices, while on the other hand it actively supports 
measures of state aid to large families, helps to continue indirect 
state aid to non-Ooomunist youth organizations, and in general favours 
the growth of • intermediary bodies'. II 9 
More than anything else the MRP represented the broad tendency 
within French Oatholicism called Ohristian Democraqy. Oatholics who 
were content to preserve the social. inequalities of 'static Franoe t, or 
who desired to extend the hieraraqy principle from the Ohuroh to the 
political order, were generall,y more at home in other politioal format-
ions. This Ohristian Democratio tendenoy bad a rioh past. 
Ohristian Democracy is hard to define, since it has been used in several 
different w83s during its oentury of development. Nonetheless it oan 
be said to contain four basic assertions about the nature of man: that 
all men are responsible, free and active persons in whom • the spirit 
transcends matter'; that man realizes his spiritual and materia.l well-
being onl\Y as a member of societYJ that the aims of political action 
never oan be finall,y fixea., but represent a succession of stages J that 
each man will be able to develop his faoulties cru.,- if the entire society 
is organized throughout all of its structures on the basis of the 
privacy of' every man, respecting his liberty and perm! tting him to 
exercise his responsibilities. The Ohristian Democra.ts also 
furnished the MRP with three 'laws of' history': that men, through free 
~ll, are the makers of their own happiness or misery; that progress 
occurs primari13 through a ohange in the spiritual sphere of society; 
that the oanpetition and cooperation of f'orces, spiritual families, 
or civilizations oause its great movements; progress occurs through a 
dialeotical process in whioh. a c1em:l..nant spiri tual f~l\Y generates its 
opposite. other Ohristian Democratio views would inolude a neo-
Thomistio thear;y of man and sooiety J and an eoonomic system based on the 
~ W. Bosworth, Cath.olicism An:iOrisis in Modem Franoe, P.259. 
13 .. 
reoognition of individual and group rights. The :MRP was not, however, 
alW83"s fai thf'ul to its philosophioal heritage, especially to the notion 
of politioal pluralism, once it had massive politioal strength itself. 
The most striking thing about all these principles is their vagueness. 
One also has the impression that in develOping towards • dead oentre' 
the MRP renounced those prinoiples that seemed to evoke speoifio pro-
grammes; for instanoe, the social oontrol of certain private property. 
still, J'Jl8n1' other ideas must also be included wi thin the Ohristian 
Democratic philosoph;y, among them the notion of personalism - the 
development of the whole man - and pluralism - the opposition to 
totalitarianism through canpeting and diverse social groupings. The 
activities of the MRP were not like those of Oatholio Action or social 
action groups. They were not explicitly or implicitly designed for 
a religious end, nor were they explicitly or implioitly controlled by 
the 'Hiera.roby'. Many had a pragmatic or political or economio, 
but not religiOUS, raison d' ~tre. 
The divisions between French Oatholics were such that on occasion 
their conflicts could appear as ideologioal st~gles and even as the 
only real pitiless struggle in Franoe. "Quand on assaie de voir 
olaire daM cette malee, ilfaut se gerder de deux tentations: tout 
reduire a W'1e oppositioa politique entre une droite et una gauche, tout 
~crire en te:nnes de discordes comma sdl le catholicisme Francais n t avai t 
l> 
pas de traits originaux bien marques. Les notions de ndroi tell at de 
"gauche" conviennent mal, ne serait-ce que a oause de la n4oessit' de 
distinguer des 'ext~s et des JIlOd$res ••• En. outre, las mots "gauche" et 
Itc!lroite" font cuelier ltaxistenoe de problJmes th&ologiquas et 
philosophiques in~pandents de ltevolution politque. Aussi vaudrai t ... 
il mieu:x: parler de "~tiens non-traditionnels" et de "o~tiens 
trad1tionnals", ce qui laisse oependant de cot' les "ultras It : les 
cbretiens progressistes tent6s par le communisme, les int~gristes attires 
par une sorte de fasoisme. Les progressistes font parler d t eux 
pendant les prem1e:ms ~es de 1a !;y'e R(,publ1que, 1es int'gristes 
contribuent ~ en ab~ger la derniere. 0 .Dans una oertaine mesure, i1 y a 
bien une sorte de flux puis de reflux. L'intervenlion de Rome contribue 
beaucoup d celui-oi. Depuis l' encyc1ique Humani Ganeris en 1950. It 10 
The gist of the distinotion between Christian Democrats and Social 
Oatho1ios was that the former sought to achieve social reforms for the 
masses through the direct participation of Oatho1ics in politics in some 
fonn of party organization. In contrast social Oatho1ios believed 
that higher officials ot the Ohurch should take indireot political action 
to provide for the masses the amount of social reform considered advis-
able by the Oatholic Right J for instance, they favoured a hierarchical 
political organization, with control being exerted downward trom the 
higher levelso Social Oatho11os believed that it was the funotion 
of the churoh to inspire the enactment ot social measures and to define 
the attitudes t~t others should have. Paternalism was favoured, and, 
in contrast to the emphasis on politics of individual Ohristian Demo-
crats, Scoia1 Oatholios gave priority to the Ohuroh over political 
considerations 0 
At times sane :MRP leaders were quiok to seize the initiative in 
pursuance of their ideology, as did Schuman in announcing his ~lan in 
1950. But they usua.lly had to be more oircumspect beoause of their 
positions of responsibility in the Government. "On the surface, 
policy is supposedl.y created by oanbined discussion and deoisions on 
veriOl1S levels' of the MRP party struoture. Besides the 100a1 seotions 
and department federations, there is a national oonmittee, as well as 
a National Oongress, which meets once a year." 11 Perhaps the best 
illustration of the oentralized oharaoter of the MRP was to be found in 
the wtqs in whioh party politioal activity, 8.\t the levels of sections 
10 A Grosser, La IVe Republique et sa politique exterieure, pp. 180-181. 
11 R. B. Oapelle, The :MRP and French Foreign Po1ioy, p.22. 
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and federations, was regulated from above. The National Statutes of 
the :MRP provided that party meetings within a federation must be 
authorized by the controlling boqy of the federation in question. 
For a member of the part,y to participate in other meetings, he had to 
take the advice of the president of the federation in whose area the 
meeting. to be held. .Any discord. was to be resolved by the 
National Executive Oommitteeo One of the weaknesses of the:MRP, in 
spite of the fact of its ideology and its support of pluralism, was its 
failure to foster enough local support and political activity to make a 
spontaneous cc:mnunity life possible, thereby falling in step with France 
as it fell out of step with its awn doctrine. The MRP had. developed 
its theoretical support for pluralism onlJr in respect to the fami13 grcup. 
It had failed to maintain direct contacts with public opinion and. to 
stress the oivic spirit. This weakness was main13 a reflection of 
the fact that it had been from the beginning a oentralized party. The 
centraUzation of control in the hands of a few leaders (however muoh 
they might disagree among themselves) allowed scant leewq for the 
deoentralization of power impliCit in the idea of pluralism. The 
party was enthusiastic about local or regional planning in social and 
economic matters, but was soeptical about provinoial autO!lOD\Y'. Thus 
through its centralization of oontrol, the MRP preserved to all outward 
appearanoes a surprising degree of cohesion, but close examination 
discloses. a striking dualism within the party. If the MBP pretended 
to be a movement then its leaders and thinkers who led in the searoh for 
the w83 to develop for instanoe . European integration, were few in 
number. Sinoe they were so few, one would expeot them to have done 
all wi thin their power to pub1ioize their programmes in order to com-
pensate. But this was not so. One of the most justifiable 
oriticisms of the Schuman po1ioy was that there was no widespread 
oampaign to explain the European idea and the saorifioes it would entail 
to the French people or even to the • omnipotent t parliament. To a 
certain extent, however, this is not surprising as the local interests 
ot the predominant13 rural voters in:MRP stronghold areas, such as 
Britt~ or the mountainous areas ot Oatholic allegiance, were quite 
divorced, at least in their own minds, from European problems, and it 
is hard tor the leadership of a party to disregard the inclinations of 
its strongest supporters. It is much easier to attempt to proceed 
quiet13 and not arouse public opinion too much. In order to gain a 
majori ty backing for policies such as European integration it would have 
been necessary for the MRP to have had the broadest possible contacts 
with the French nation. Yet, although the Ml-?P represented a ver:y 
broad spectrum of people, it oould not make its influence suftioient13 
felt either by means ot the pressor let alone the business world. Most 
important, however, was the basic tact that the MRP was in essence a 
regional party even though its basical~ centralized organization belied 
this. Yet, "As the situatim actu~ developed, the only really 
active allies ot the MRP in its progrsm ot integration were to be found 
within Oatholic groups. The party had very slim oontacts with 
business, where there were DI.8.l\Y foes of integration; and sections of 
labor and the press were increasingly alienated from the MRP. Final~ 
in some aspects of MRP toreign policy, the bureaucraoy, an interest group 
in itself, tended to cmtrol rather than support SCl1le of the party' s 
leaders. It 12 
In sane ways it was an advantage tor the MRP to be classitied as 
the 'Catholio Party': there was a certain tenaoity, devotion to doctrine, 
and party loyalty within the MRP that ~ have been related to the 
religiosity of its memberso But there was a general political dis-
advantage tor the :MRP in being identified as the Oatholio party. 
Franoe is Oatholio on the surface, but there -are relatively few praotis-
ing Oatholios in France. Anti-olerioalism is a strong politioal foroe, 
12 R. Be Oapelle, The MRP and Frenoh Foreign Policy, P.,36. 
especialliY in the Radioal Socialist and Socialist parties, as well as 
the Oommunist Party, of oourse. The MRP had sought uniqueness by 
oe.l1ing itself not only a movement but also 'the party of the Fourth 
Republic', but it was given an unsolicited and unwanted ~ue position 
when IDlU\Y identified it as the Oatholio party. In oriJer for the MRP 
to accomplish its purpose in a foreign polioy as c%Ynamio as its plan 
for European integration, as delioate as the problem of relations with 
Russia and the U.S., and as difficult as its policy toward the Frenoh 
Union and North Africa, the party needed ID8DY supporters. It is true 
that the MRP wu at the centre of a series of active groups in the 
Oatholio orbit, but besides having the disadvantages of being a 
regional party, it lacked proper contacts with business and was pro-
gressiveliY losing oontact with labour and the press during the period 
under oonsideration. It should be noted, however, that those were 
handioaps and not necessariq disoredi ts. Despi te the 1951 Ie Monde 
incident, the MRP seemed to st83" olear of the venal connections with the 
press that were typioal,or sane Frenoh political parties. And, exoept 
for aspects of the North African affair, the slim contacts of the MRP 
with business meant that the party was not willing to eater :fOr the 
speoial interests of this segment of French sooiety at the expense of 
its long-teroID programme of European integration. 
·'Although DUU:lJ' Europeans left religion at hane when they talked 
about the integration of Europe, untortunate13 for the MRP, its anti-
olerical opponents neither allowed the party to leave religion at hane 
nor the religiONS issue to lie dor.mant at home. Although Blum and 
Guesde, leaders of the SOCialists, had attacked the spirit of anti-
olerioalism, the MRP-Socialist allianoe that existed up to 1950 soon 
became .trained over the issueo And the Sooiali.ts were not the only 
opponents of the J4RP in this respeot. The anti-olerioal Radioal 
Socialists had also taken a harsh stand against the MRP as ear13 as 
September, 1950, beoause of the party's alleged intransigenoy on 
educational reform and the ohuroh-school issue. Near~ half of the 
MRP parliamentary group after the 1951 elections oame from depari1nents 
where the issue of ohurch-state relations was' paramount. This had 
a fundamental effect upon the seneral voting behaviour of representatives 
in parli$D16nt." 13 The MRP was trying to exist where, even if it 
were not impossible to survive, its existenoe was an embarrassment not 
o~ to those it had to ally with but also to itselt. Unlike Germany 
or ItalJr, France was not emerging tres~ from self-imposed totalitarian 
rule end the rejection by Oonservatives of the old order was somewhat a 
sop to deoency and therefore onqtem.poraryo Besides wi thin France 
a majority of the eleotorate was not opposed to the Ohurch. It is 
possible to argue therefore that there was no need for a Ohristian 
Democratic party in a oountry that was as inherentq Christian Democratic 
as was France at this period. 
MRP statements on its position with regard to the Union Fran~aise 
and Europe une traduisent pas seulement une oonviction. Elles 
ri1pondent sussi a. un souci tactique; il ne faut pas que le MRP apparaisse 
camne obnubile par l' Europe, ocmne dispes' ~ sacrifioer la pAsenoe 
fr~aise hoI'S d'Europe ~ l' unification de oelle-oi. L' Union 
Fran~aise constitue, d.ans une mesure appreciable, une prioooupation - alibi. 
LEt plus Ct1X'1eux est que 16 ferveur europ'enne resulte e11e-~e d'une 
sorte de transfert: 83'ant glisS'e vel'S 18 oonservatisme en poli tique 
interieure, le parti retrouve une justifioation ~ son nan de "mouvement" 
dau'ls 1'ialte d tune renovation de la sooiete intemationa18 en Europe. 
En fin de oompte, on en revient ainsi a manif'ester 1a volente de trans-
former la aooiet' politique nationale puisque l' Europe, une foia 
oonstituee, doit foumir les solutions des problemas '&oonomiques et 
sociaux qui se posent dans les P83'a qu' elle s 'unifier ... It 14 
13 R. B. Oapelle, The MRP and Frenoh Foreign Polioy, P.17. 
14 A. Grosser, La IVe Rt,publique et sa politique ext-erieme, P.125. 
f ., The Plan Sohuman: was a ver.v effective first step towards solving the 
German problem as coal and steel were, almost inevitably, at the oentre 
ot all the discussions a' propos Gennanyo In a sense the politioal 
organization of Europe would not ol'll3 'be able to be born from, but almost 
had to be an institution built on coal and steel, as without widening 
the basis of the aareement and without creating a political authority. 
the EaSO would remain dangerously isolated and would thereby lose most 
of its meaning. 
"The prinoipal purpose of the MRP program of European integration 
was to solve the diftioult GeIman problem. The party sought to 
convinoe France in particular and Western Gel'm8.fl3' in general that a 
greater security oould be aohieved through the construction of a . 
In this w8¥, the party related its program of integration 
to what had at times approximated an almost pathological Frenoh search 
for securityo In supporting the Schuman Plan, the MRP emphasized 
that two objeoti ves oould be achieved, one poli tioal and one economio. 
Europe would be freed of the old f'e!\\d between France and Ger'lllElny. At 
the same time the incrustations of Franoe,'s national eoonoow would be 
sloughed oft, and the level of living would be raised in Franoe as well 
as elsewhere." 15 
It is possible that the reason for the laok of attention to suoh 
matters as European integration and relations with the French Union and 
Atcllia might be found in the relative unanimity of the :MRP on foreign 
polioy and were therefore not considered worthy of muoh attention at the 
annual National' Oongresseso Then aaain this relative disregard for 
foreign policy ~7 the KIP, ola:lming as it did a unique 'European vocation' 
seemed to be a reflection of what has been referred to as the inoredible 
indifference of the French people to foreign affairs. Whatever, the 
problem was oompounded by the lack of oontaot between the MRP and the 
15 R. B. Oapelle, The MRP and French Foreign Policy, Po52. 
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Frenoh people. This br$akdown cooured beoause ot limited geographioal 
areas, beoause ot particular religious inclinations, and beoause ot the 
oentralized oharacter of the MRP. The MRP was immobilized to suoh an 
extent that it oould not generate reallJ' active and oontinuous enthusiasm 
even within its own ranks tor its programme ot European integration. 
The system helped stitle the outlets ot party adherents too. In the 
lower echelons, not even the militants among party adherents were able 
to oa:rr,y any appreoiable weight, whether they expressed themselves 
through the seotions, tederations or National Oongresses. Thus the 
MRP as a basio organization was a oonalomeration that was awkward to 
use etteotive~ in the pursuit ot stated ideals. It is possible, 
in this light, to view the MRP as a medioore organization. The end 
ot Tripartisme in 194.7 saw the end ot oooperation. between all the major 
poli tioal groupings and the beginning ot a period whioh saw muoh 
inetteotual action and shadow-boxing. The MRP was almost oan:plete~ 
caught up in the spirit ot the times and, apart trom the occasional 
streak ot individual creativity, it did not send out 8J\Y waves. 
The corporate identity it asS\Dned was very low in protile. In a 
period ot relative inactivity the MRP did not emerge as one ot the 
leading lights, in spite ot its programmes and its philosophy. 
However, this relative absenoe ot a legislative tlurr,y and the seeming~ 
endless prooession ot ministries tends to oonoeal the tact that there 
were severe onslaughts being direoted against the existing system by 
the 'extreme' movements - the 001l!llUnists and the RPF. In all 
proba'bili ty it was the tact ot these threats that oaused the particular 
type ot immo'bility that occured as the system attempted to proteot itselt. 
As an emergency measure the law of 1951 was a suooess: it 
deprived the extremists ot the power they needed to wreok the govern-
ment ot the oountr,y. To destra,y the system theQ)Operation of the 
oentreparties was still neoessar,y. "Eti gestation dep~u:ts pres 
d 'un an, la rllforme -eleotorale avait entra1'nb la ohute d tun 
gouvernement, oelui de Pleven, et manrlue de provoquer oelle de sou 
suooesseur M. Queuille. La ~tor.me etait d' invention dhmooratie-
ohr$tienne. 11 sutfisait gae deux au plusiers listes s'apparentent 
et obtiennent la majori ~ absolue de voix pour heri tel' de taus les 
si~ges d' Wl ~artement. Les partis "oond.a.mn'es a vivre ensemble" 
au gouvernement avaiii dono Wl motif noble: n' etai t-il pas logique que 
le majorite parlementaire soit aussi Wle majorit~ 61eotorale, que les 
/ I partis unis au pouvoir se presente assooies devant le p~s? Mals au 
:fait c t 'etait la orainte qui aurait conduit ~ oette loi d' apparentement. 
Tout portait ~ croire en eftet que 8i la rep~sentation proportionelle 
etait maintenue, la future assembl~e seratt oomme l' opinion, divis'e 
en trois fractions 8ensiblement ~gales: les oommunistes, les guallistes 
et l'entre-deux, otest-a-dire la troisieme force. AUOWl de oes trois 
oamps n' ~ant .. lui seul la majori te ne pour ..,rai t ni gouvernel', ni 
s 'entendre aveo un autre, sinon pour barrel' la troisieme. Le 
meoanisme constitutional serait enr~b et le seul moyen etait de 
valoriser artifioiellement l'un des trois camps au d~triment des deux 
autres. S' estimant en 'tat de legi time ~fense, la troisidme foroe 
entendit que oe oamp-la. f'ut le sien et elle assembla ses el~ments 
disparates sur le s'~lA the)me q~i leur fut ooomrun : la demooratie 
parlementaire. " 16 In effeot, as far as the MRP was oonoerned, 
the eleotoral law was a matter ot politioal survival not on~ of itself' 
but also ot the other 'oentrist' parties, and therefore the end of the 
reasona.b~ democratio Frenoh political system then in existenoe. 
After the eleotion the new Assemb4r met on the 5th of July and 
re-elected the President on the 10th. Pleven, however, was not 
invested until the 8th of Augusto Thus the legislature started 
with a new orisis, and yet a majority had. emerged from the eleotions 
16 J. Fauvet, La IVe R6publique, pp.172-173. 
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that exoluded only the Oonmuni.'Sts and. the RPF. Logioally it should 
have beoOOle the parliamentary majority and the government been in its 
image; these two propositions are basioal13 inseparable as a party 
will not support for an:s oonsiderab1e length ot time a ministry in 
whioh it is not partioipating. This crisis.. which served as a long 
introduotion and as a bad omen to the new legislature appears to have 
had only one oause; the problem of churoh schools. By i tsel£ this 
problem would not have been enough to destroy the 'troisieme foroe', 
however, the c~ was broken before the majority had even settled 
into offioe and this bade ill for the future. 
Mollet, a Socialist, asked for the nationalization of eduoation 
after the election; but his party was on the defensive and therefore 
was inolined more to attempt to preserve the status quo rather than 
to attempt to achieve its demands for. the complete dismantlement of 
the private sohools apparatus. The MRP_ on the other hand_ invited 
Parliament to "assure sans a.&lai 18. liberte reelle de l' enseignement. 
11 n' est dono pas juste d' :1.mputer le rev«til de 18. querelle a: 18. seule 
droite - qui n'a jamais fait que suivre le MRP en oe domaine, ni au 
seul RPF qui 1 t avai t preoeM en 1an~ant ~ grand fracas son projet 
d l allocation-eduoation. Par oonviotion_ int6ret ou taotique, le 
MRP a pas' le pa-ri au seuil _e de 10. nouvelle Assembl'e. En 
r-'glant le probleme de's le depart, i1 pensait ctebarrasser de l' obstacle 
18. route de la majorite et que l' epr~ve pass'e, oette majorit' serait 
plus libre de ses mouvements." 17 History proved them wrong and the 
MRP found itself forced into a position it originally did not intend 
to oooUPYo 
The years 1950 and. 1951 saw in 'Frenoh politios the effeotive 
triumph of 'iDmobilisme', all attempts to put the regime baok on the 
17 J. Fau.vet, La IVe Republique, pp. 182-183. 
paths of action failed. Bidault attempted to introduoe elements of 
authority and strength, and was broken as a result. Bidault, 
however, did not leave in disgrace; he was the on13 prime minister to 
leave power in the proper constitutional manner. He did not hide 
behind votes of oonfidence and flee when he was threatened; he left 
when he was beaten. Atter him oame Pleven, who tried to gain the 
initiative but suooeeded in solving neither the sohool question, nor 
in revising the Oonstitution, nor in reforming the eleotoral law. 
During this period no. real solutions were found to the major 
oontemporar,y problems, although in some instances a beginning was made. 
All would have been well had the world remained 'immobile' as well, 
but such was not the case. In France meanwhile there was not one 
majori ty whioh would be able to take a s tend on all the different 
iSsues, rather there was one major! ty per problem, and one solution per 
government. "La ~faut d' unite geogra,phique, sooiologue ou m~me 
intelleotuelle des diverses tendanoes polit~ues n' a pas seulement 
pour eff'et d' opposer les partis les Ul'lS aux autres J il di vise ohacun 
d' ewe: oon.tre lui-meme. Les grandes querelles contemporaires ont 
/ I I Mohire ohaque famille d' espr! to Il en a ete ainsi des D\)1'thes ou 
des r~ali t's de Munioh ou de Viohy, du drame de la O. E. D. ou de 18. 
. ;: guerra d Algerie. Oar ohaque parti ou presque a ses ouvriers et 
ses bourgeois, ses ruraux et ses oitad1ns, ses nostal....giques du pass~ 
I 
et ses ourieux de l' avenir, ses meridionaux et ses nordiques, ses 
homnes de droite et ses hommes de gauoheo 
mani~e una petite France. II 18 
Ohaque parti es t ~ sa 
Whatever the political importance of the MRP in general, it does 
not seem to have oontributed ver.y muoh at all to the politioal impaot 
of the eoolesiastioal nuoleus at the hub of French Oatholioism. 
Perhaps the main :impact was negati va: the existence of the :MRP as a 
18 J. Fauvet, La Franoe ~chiree, pp. 105-106. 
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focal potnt for Oatholios made it impossible for all the moderate-left 
poli tioal forces tn Franoe to unite· tn one strong single party. 
CHAPTER II 
THE POLITIOAL SIGNIFIOANOE OF 
TIlE 1951 ELEOTORAL LAW AND 
THE GENERAL ElECTION OF JUNE 17. 1951. 
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In the 1951 Assemb13 out of a total of 627 deputies, 83 (ino1uding 
Algerians) were overseas deputies. It is interesting to ponder upon 
the degree mandates foraotion oould be olaimed by governments based on 
shifting and part:q fortuitous ooalitions, dependent perhaps for 
majorities on the votes of the overseas deputies whose primar;y" oonoern 
was hardly likely to be a well .. thought-out programme for the general 
good of Metropolitan Franoe - although it is debatable to what extent 
a number of the deputies of Metropolitan Franoe itself applied them-
selves to this goal, particularly when it meant that their oonstituenoies 
would suffer, or, at least, not benefit fran it. There were also the 
problems oreated by the ooa1itions between the parties of the Third Foroe -
the grouping of those parties that can be olustered under the loose 
label of 'centrist' - coalitions that were flimsy and internally 
divided to suoh an extent that their 1ife-expeotanoies were not long. 
In suoh a situation it would be expeoted that there be a oertain 
amount of oynioism on the part of Frenobnen with regards to their 
governments; but suoh an attitude does not appear to have been refleoted 
in their poli tioal behaviour during the first deoade of the Fourth 
Repub1ioo In the election for the Assembly in November 1946 (a year 
of 2 e1eotions and 2 referenda) 78.5% of the e1eotorate went to the 
polls, and in 1951 . 81 0 2% did sOo Georges Bidau1 t ocmnented on the 
oontemporary soene that " ••• publio life, espeoia1ly electoral 
oampaigns 1Es4\ an artifioial, archaio and often sordid aharaotero 
But in spite of it all, France was gradua113 beooming prosperous again. 
Behind the petty and disorder13 f~ad.e, order was being re-established, 
produotion was inoreasing, employers and salaried workers were slowly 
beginning to have oonfidence in the future, These oonorete results 
got little publioi ty; on13 the hordes of detraotors were heard. One 
reason for the improvement was the stability of the French civil service. 
Our institutions were perhaps flimsy; but at least they existedo 
Administration was good, the State Oounoil was respeoted and our law 
oourts were respectable. Our army was discontented, but it had been 
modernized. It 1 There still seems to be a case for s¢ng that the 
lack of intermediate elements ot oohesion in sooiety - whatever torm 
they IIl83' take, and strong looal institutions are onl,y one possibility 
among many - will tend to make the state either too strong or too weak. 
The French would, on average, detinite13 preter the latter, tempering 
a nominal impersonal centralization by the impaot ot countless seltish 
and partisan pressureso In a period when the alternative was otten 
one torm ot totalitarianism or another, the ohoic,e was neither 
unintelligent nor dishonourable. Nor was it fatal. 
One undoubted result of the fall of Franoe and the Vich3r interlude 
had. been to give elements among French Catholics a new impetus to find 
a bridge between their taith and the needs ot contemporar.y society -
particularly that urban industrial sooiety, tor the most part long-
estranged from the ohuroh. This impetus took varied torms ranging 
from the idea ot Communists and Oatholios working in a movement to better 
working-olass oonditions (re-christiani'llling the worker through mission-
ary aotivity by "worker-priests II - a movement whioh the Vatican cut, 
short as inoompat~le with the worker-priest's spiritual funotions), to 
the idea ot replacing the small Catholic-democratic groups ot the Third 
Republio with a new major party devoted to the Church, but detini tely 
on the left in its social and economio progranme. This, however, 
created a dilemma. as the MRP, as the Catholio party, drew its eleotoral 
strength predominantly from the strongly Catholic and conservati va 
1 G. Bidault, Resistance, p.171. 
departments ot eas tern and western France, and that outside these it was 
suspeot, as a party approved by the Ohurch. Thus it was very diff ... 
icult, to be a 'Oatholio'pBrty as well as 9. 'leftist' one. To a 
oertain extent, however. this problem was alleviated by the events up 
to 1951 and also by the outoome of the 1951 eleotion whioh, ovdng to a 
ohallenge to the :MRP by the reoonstituted Right, meant that, in part at 
least, those who voted. tor the MRP in that year wem:01.a;erage basically 
more purely Ohristia.n democrat than had previously been the case. 
Pdssibly the major oonsequence of this was that the movement beoame 
more a party than a movement and proceeded as a more disoiplined body, 
mainly because there was greater internal oonsensus. 
As early as the two first Assemblies of the Fourth Republio it 
emerged clearl3' that the politieal parties had not developed into the 
homogeneous and disoiplined f~tions whioh same had hoped and same 
had feared would be the fruit of the adoption of proportional repre-
sentation. The whole tendeno,y of the oountry's poli~s, tortified 
by the opportunities which the procedures of the legislative body gave 
to the private member against the ministry, worked in the oontrary 
direot:1.on. Given the strength of the looal roots of political 
personalities party exoommunieationwas not politioal death in parties 
other than the Oommunist party. :aeoause the parties were weak, 
local strength was what mattered to the politioian. Beoause adminis-
tration was oentralized, what interested the eleotors was to a large 
extent the nature of deoisions made at the oentreq " .,lven when the 
department rather than the single-meIDber oonstituency became the unit, 
the elector continued to regard his deputy very much as an ambassador 
to the government on behalf of local interests. 
The etforts of the MRP to ohange the politioal attitudes of those 
social groups, generally impregnated with Oatholicism, who before the 
war had supported the oonservative parties was not crowned with suooess. 
, I 
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The MRP tried to inoula.te them with a larger conception of the "common 
good", by persuading them to acoept the prospeot of a sweeping reform 
of the traditional struoture of French sooiety. The ease with which 
the voters who had supported tl:e MRPin 1945 and 1946 abandoned it in 
1947, not o~ for the RPli' (whioh, after all, expressed at least 
poli tioallJr, if not sooial13', a desire for reform) but for the oonserv ... 
atives_ Moderates or Radicals who exploited de Gaulle's name, 
demonstrated that the attitudes of these people had not reallJr ohanged 
after the Liberation. They had supported the MRP for lack of some-
thing better_ beoause it seemed to them to be able to cheok Oommunism, 
but they had never really supported either the programme or the doctrine 
of the party for whioh they voted. The MRP's eleotoral deoline after 
1946 suggests that a large part of the Frenoh publio was returning to 
an eoonomioally and sooial13' oonservative attitude. 
Most people who beoame MRP members or who voted :MRP did so beoause 
of religious factors in the main. People joined the MRP to be in 
the 'fami13" as it were, among fellow sooia1 Oatholios and Ohristian 
Democrats working in the poli tioal sphere. This was the basio faotor 
that differentiated the MRP from other parties: if there had been no 
'French Oatholioism' there would still have been an In~pertdent and a 
Gau1list party - but the MRP would not have existed. There were, 
however, sooial Oatholics in other parties - in the PRL, the RPF, the 
UDSR and even in the SOCialist Party. although whether these Catholics 
in parties other than the MRP reall3' lound them satisfaotor,y pro10ng-
ations of their. religious prinoiples or not is debatable. 
the MRP's olientele included praotioally no non-Catholios. 
Oonverse13, 
It would 
appear tha.t the number of practising Oatholios favouring the MRP was 
aotually higher than the munber of votes whioh the :MRP received in 19.51, 
and an opinion poll oonduoted in 1952 showedimpressi ve13' how 'olerioal' 
the MRP's supporters really were. The MRP inherited from its 
religious fbrebears a spiritualism that would have been able to put it 
on the Right in the olassio division of politioal tendenoieso At the 
same time many of its Ohristian Democratic political opinions tied it to 
the Left. There was a oonsiderable and constant tension between the 
two orientations, and the MRP oonsequently found itself ill at ease in 
either oamp. It was one of the pillars of the ziegime and the defender 
of the family, but it did not constitute a oement sinoe no majority of 
the centre parties could be constituted either with them or without them. 
This political ambiguity and the unstable politioal position of the MRP 
appear to have had basically religious oauses. However, many of the 
specifio activities of the MRP were frankly pragmatio, and could in no 
w~ be attributed to its Oatholio inspiration, even though the MRP on 
ocoasion did use its spiritUalist based doctrine to justify oertain 
actions. 
The MRP's party oonstitution had been designed so as to strengthen 
the party leadership, though it oould not al~s avoid confliots or 
even win them. 
than other parties. 
In general the MRP applied formal rules less strictly 
Atter August 1948, when twenty MRP deputies 
refused to support Paul ReynA\Ud' s oonservati ve eoonomic polioy, the 
party often had dissenters of both Bight and left. But strong bonds 
held it together: its members shared a oommon religious faith, a oommon 
poli tioal experience in the pre-war and Resistance generation, and the 
sense of a mission to reconcile the Ohurch wi th the Republioo 
Internal divisions oonsequently did less harm to the MRP than to other 
parties. But though by the time of the 19.51 eleotion the t disoipline 
de vote' was orl4r a memory in the MRP, its deputies prided themselves 
on a oohesion based on loyalty to the movement rather than fear of 
sanotions. They rarely carried their differenoes with the party 
beyond abstention to a hostile vote. Their indisoipline was 
associated less with specific ministries and more with problems of 
principle, often personal and specifio. 
"Le systE\me de la troisi_ force ne ~alisai t une majori te de 
gouvem.ement que par le jeu dtune double resistance, t:t gauche et tl 
droite, aboutissant ~ la constitution d'un centre. Les deux partis 
qui l'ormaient le double pilier au syst~e, MRP et SFIO, n' etaient 
d' accord que sur un commun penchant vera une politique sooiale et 
'conanique de dirigisme.' Ils ne 1 t etaient plus s' il s' agissait 
de la politique laique selOll._ l' esprit au regime preo6dent. Les 
deux partie se divisait alors, l' un attire a' gauche, l' autre a droite. 
Une complication suppl1:Jmentaire naissai:t au fa! t que les deux fonnatioID3 
parlementaires n' ~taient pasassez nanbreuses ~ elles seules pour faire 
une majori t': l' appoint d t elements radioaux ou mOderes demeurai t 
indispensableo Et, lA encore, il y avait division, oar 011 n'etait 
d' accord que sur un llberalisme anti-dirigiste, mais nOH uniformement 
sur le latoisme. Si la majorite etroite se divisait par example sur 
l' ecole, la majorite elargie Se divisait, elle, sur la conoeption de 
l' 'tat et la limite; de ses interventious. Si, en ~it de l'instabilit'e 
m1nist~rielle, un systeme de majorit' en somma durable reussissait 
,guand uteme ~ s t etablir aveo sta'bilite de la politique suivie, c' est 
paree que le darJger d' una opposition au tegime, s' imposait "8.;, tout 
instant, Boit de la part des cOnnm.mistes, soit de la part du 
Rassemblement au peuple fran~aiso On arrivait a{\maintenir un 
:> 
gouvernement paree qu • il fallait, par simple instinot el6mentaire 
de survivre. It 2 
It appeared more and more olearly to the parties of the majority 
that maintainirig the eleotoral system of 1946 might be unfavourable for 
The advantages that the system of 1946 gave to the large 
parties would benefit the two parties of the opposition, the Cormnunist 
party and the RPF, and harm the four Centre groups because of the very 
2 Lt .A.nn8e Politique, 19.51, p.VIII. 
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faot that there were fou:r of them. The proportional principle itself 
might result in the eleotion of an ungovernable assembly if eaoh of the 
two extreme parties won about one~fourth of the votes. The interests 
of the government parties lq, therefore, in adopting an eleotoral 
system whioh would permit them, in one ~ or another, to bolster one 
another in the balloting. This r_quired giving certain advantages 
to a group that could win a relative majority, whioh the Oentre parties 
oould do by ocmbining their popular vote. "The parties of the 
majority - the Sooialists, the Popular Republioans, the Radioals and 
the Moderates who were sympathetio to the government - and even some 
of the Moderates and Radioals who were in the opposition but not sub-
servient to the RPF, had no difficulty in agreeing on the goals of a 
ohange in the eleotoral system. These were to reduce the n\mlber of 
deputies of the isolated parties, whioh meant oertainly the Oommunist 
party and eventually the RPF; to make it possible for neighbouring 
parties to ally with one another; and to introduoe the majority 
principle. The last point was designed to enable a ooali tion whioh 
might win more votes than either of the opposition parties to win a 
majority of seats in the Assembly even if the ooalition won less than 
half the total votes cast."':3 The first five years of the Fourth 
Republio are oruoial in eny study of the MRP's eleotoral performanoe 
for between 1946 and 19.51 the MRP's vote fluotuated considerably. 
Thereafter the peroentage of votes oast for the party settled dawn to 
about 11% until the General Eleotion of 1962. The General Eleotion 
of 1946 favoured the :MRP inordinately compared to the party's real 
appeal owing to the situation of the d83'. In 1947 the RPF was 
founded by de Gaulle and the Right onoe again beoame respectable. By 
1947 the MRP was in danger of beooming no more than a pressure group 
associated to the Ohuroh, at least judging by the results of the local 
elections held in that year. It beoame imperative, fran the point 
3 F. Goguel, Franoe Under The Fourth Republio, pp. 67-68. 
of view of the MRP, that the eleotoral system should be biased in its 
favour, or at least should not favour the two major, extreme parties. 
Eleotoral ref~ had a difficult passage among the reefs of 
oonflioting party interests, second preferences, and minority opinions. 
The MRP alone among the oentre parties stood in favour of proportional 
representation, and was eventuallJr driven to oompromise in order to 
esoape unpopularity. and an ungovernable, Gaullist-dominated .Assemblyo 
However, even more than that, the prospeot of the seoond ballot worried 
the MRP. Its determination not to include this as part of the new 
system eventually oaused the reluotant Radioals and the indifferent or 
divided, Socialists and Oonservatives to oompromise as well, and to 
settle for a complioated, basioally proportional representative type of 
system with no second ballot. As R$my Roure said in the Mome of 
26 April 1951, it was 'the least honest eleotoral law in Frenoh history'. 
liThe new law was similar in prinoiple though not in method to that 
of 1919. It amended and did not repeal the PR law. of 1946, keeping 
the same oonstituenoies (exoept that Gironde was divided), the same 
system of party lists with a oandidate for every seat, and the same 
illusory preferential vote. But panaohage was now allowed; by-
eleotions, abolished in 194.5, were restoredJ and though in theory seata 
were still distributed by PR, two new provisions transformed the working 
of the system: apper entements and the absolute majority ruleo 
...... 
Everywhere outside the Paris area lists oould form an allianoe or 
apparentement, and their votes were then oounted together as if oast 
for a single list, (in Qrder to be able to allJr with another party it 
was necessary that a party be deemed to be a • national' party, in other 
words that it present oandidates in at least thirty departments. In 
19.51 eleven parties qualified, some of them (and man,y of their lists) 
were boguso The Baris area had a form of PR whioh helped the weaker 
parties, depriving the RPFiQ the OP of nine seats in 19.51). .Any 
list or allianoe whioh won an absolute majority of votes took ever.y seat. 
PRwas still used to distribute.seats both within an allianoe, and 
generallY when no one won an absolute majority of voteso This 
system enabled the government parties to oombine and so gain the 
advantage of size whioh in 1945-46 went to the 'big three' and in 1951 
would otherwise have gone to the two oppositions. Moreover, the 
oombined Oentre might win an absolute majority, and oould therefore 
attract oitizens wanting to 'vote usefullY'. Government supporters 
argued that a vote for RPF was a vote for the Oommunists. II 4 It 
seemed likelY that in most provinoial oonstituenoies the Rl~ and the 
Oommunists would be weaker than in the Paris region, and that the total 
poll of the oentre parties would often exoeed half the votes oast~ , 
Therefore in these con.sl1 tuenoies the system of 1946 was retained, subjeot 
to oertain drastio ohangeso In each oonstituency allianoes oould be 
made between 'national' parties. If in arw provinoial oonstituency 
an isolated list or an allianoe of lists gained an absolute majority 
of the votes oast, then that list or allianoe won all the seats; it 
the absolute majority had been won by an allianoe, the seats were 
distributed among the allied lists by the system of the highest 
average. If no list or allianoe won an absolute majority of the 
votes, then the seats were distributed among all the competing alliances 
and isolated lists by the system of the highest average; in this 
distribution the votes for each allianoe would be taken together to 
deterr~e the number of seats won by the alliance, and then those seats 
would be distributed among the allies by the system of the highest 
average. No seat could be allooated to an isolated or allied list 
whose votes were fewer in number than five peroent of the total number 
ot electors casting votes in the constituency. 
4 P. M. Williams, Oris is and Oompromise, p. 313. 
In theory, the requirement that only 'national' parties could a113 
themselves, one to another, could have encouraged parties to assooiate 
on the basis of some minimum programme. In fact, nothing of the 
kind happened. Under the provisions of the M~ 9, 1951 electoral 
law the allied parties were not o.,.liged to combine their programmes., 
The elector was unable to vote for a Government per se as Governments 
were the outcome only of post-election bargaining. The electoral 
law was, in a senae an emergency law, designed to save parliamentary 
demooraoy. Because. of the perpetuance of democracy by the continued 
acoeptanoe of the politioal existence of those parties whioh provided 
the threat to parliamentar,y democracy, those parties of the oentre 
that stood for democracy endangered their own existenoe, and that of 
the system they stood for. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the 
case, the method ohosen did in fact succeed in attaining its end, as 
the Oommunist and Gaullist representation in the seoond Parliament 
was not such as to make parliamentar,y government impossible. The 
Radioals, the Oonservatives and the MRP gained most from the new 
system; the Socialists gained less as they entered into fewer centre 
combinations. The HPF could have made alliances, but its leader 
preferred, nearly everywhere, independence, even though it cost him a 
few seats. The Oommunists were isolated throughout the country and 
lost heavily as a result of the new law. The two opposition parties 
had. between them just under one-half of the votes; it has been 
caloulated that the old system would have given them over one-half of 
the seats, the new one gave them a third., 
The overt aim of the system of alliances was to proteot parlia-
mentary demooracy against the two extreme parties whioh menaoed it. 
Its great fault was that it created among the parties which oounted 
on profiting from it a solidarity that was purely negative. These 
parties were agreed on opposing the Gaullists and the Oommunists, but 
they agreed on nothing positiveJ wont of all was the fact that the 
law allowed the oentre parties to do this without requir-lng them to make 
the oonoiliatory efforts neoessar,y for the elaboration of a single 
programme. This allowed alliances such as those between the Popular 
Republicans who advocated subsidies for ohurch sohools and the anti-
clerical SOCialists, so that even though each party was defending 
oontradiotory prinoiples each party was benefiting from their agreement 
on the general nature of the politioal system and hence from the votes 
cast for one and the other. "The combining of the votes reoeived by 
allied lists is an abstract operation, done a posteriati, whioh has no 
basis in reality. It is inevitable that the publio should regard the 
results as unjust, even if it reoognizes the effectiveness of the 
procedureso ••• It must be recognized, however, that this law to a 
large extent oorresponded to the necessities of the politioal situation 
as it had developed sinOCl 1947.... The diverse elements of the majority 
differed on the major problems of eoonomic, sooial, finanoial, and 
religious policy. The basic and most troublesome aspect of the 
electoral problem was the division of French opinion into several 
sectors, none of which oould gain the support of a olear majority. 
To this problem the law of May 9, 1951, gave an expedient solution which 
was more apparent than real." 5 
The results of the 1951 election showed a severe defeat for the 
two parties most responsible for oreating and governing the Fourth 
Republio. The MRP lost almost a half of . its five million voters 
of 1946, and of the four and a half million Socialist voters onl3' three 
million were left. The Canmunist strength remained almost unimpairedl 
they received five million voteso The Conservatives and the RGR -
the Radicals and their allies - retained near~ all their supporters, 
5 F. Goguel, Franoe Under the Fourth Republio, pp. 77-78. 
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two and a half and two million respectively. The RPF, (which, of course 
had not existed in 1946) won four million votes. Some came :from 
conservative-minded electors who had switohed from the MRP to General 
de Gaulle when the fonner made too ~ canpromises with the Oommunistso 
others were voters fran the older parties whose candidates had thuoght 
it advantageous to olimb on the Gaullist bandwagon, often only to jump 
off again shortly after - French politics being largely opportunistio, 
both at the individual and party level, at this time. "The election 
of June 17, 1951, therefore, was distinguished by no deoisive shift in 
opinion either from what it had been during the Third Republic or fram 
what it had been during the first years of the Fourth. One must, 
however, point out the constant reduotion, from Ootober 1945 to June 
1951, in the percentage of votes reoeived by the two Marxist parties, 
the Ocmnunist party and the Socialist party: from 38.~ in October 1945 
this peroentage declined to 35.5% in November 1946. It was only 
3104% in June 1951, which almost brings it down to the 1936 level of 
In this sense one can say that the election of 1951 was 
marked by a rather pronounoed movement to the Right, the majority of 
voters appearing to be definitely opposed to the'prinoiple of a 
oolleotivist econoo\y, although there was no majority in favo~ of an 
orthodox liberal eo0noll\Y either. 1t 6 Also now that the old Right 
and the conservatives generally were no longer worried by the reoent 
pas t (they had gi van the Vichy R~gime and all the a.ccompan,ying phenomena 
an appropriate period of mourning, and had exonerated themselves, to a 
certain extent by voting for the MRP during the first few years of the 
Fourth Republic), and besides they were also given a lead, and an 
example, by the formation of the RPF by General de Gaulle, they felt 
able to separate themselves fran the MRP and to create parties that 
were more suited to their political opinions. 
6 Fo Goguel, France Under the Fourth Republic, pp. 92-93. 
The MRP lost a half of their 1946 votes on June 17. This was 
a serious setbaok, lmt the net result was satisfaotory. 
munioipal eleotions the MRP had lost, in the oities, almost three-quarters 
of its voters of the previous fall, and had done even worse in the 
oountryside. The MRP, therefore, won back between 1947 and 1951· 
about one third of the votes it had lost between 1946 and 1947. Its 
voters now also fo:nra:l i. muoh more homogeneous area of opinion than was 
the oase in 1945 and 1946. The MRP, in effeot, no longer profited 
fran the premium that goes to the large parties, many of its previous 
voters oonsidering that to give it their vote in 1951 would be a oom-
parative waste. It was as the representatives of Ohristian Demooraoy 
in the politioal and in the social senses of the term, that the MRP 
reoeived the support of a signifioant portion of the eJ.e.otorate, whioh 
shared to a greater degree than it did in 1945 and 1946 the preoccupat-
ions and sentiments of the leaders and the militants of the party for 
whioh it voted. Nonetheless, to a certain extent, 1I1e "parti de 113. 
fid6,lite" a P8¥e aveo usure son infiablite, non point que le pa;ys se 
I deoouvre de nouveau une vocation It gaulliste" 0 Mais il lui faut 
toujours un pi:tril et quelqu t un qui le rassure ou le protegeo Contra 
le communisme, le dirigisme, le RPF a pris 113. faction ~ la plaoe du MR1~, 
il lui a pris aussi ses armes: la d~fense de l' eoole libre. Bref, 
ses voix de droi te qui flotte se>loo l' air du temps at 113. direotion des 
vents se scm.t d t auta:l'lit plus fiJiees sur les listes rassurantes des 
guallistes qu • ils ont biea souvent le visage des moa.eres. 1t 7 
Although it was stronger than its predecessor, the Popular Demooratic. 
Party, was during the Third Republio, and although its strength was 
more widespread, the MHP was really strong only in certain limited 
regions of the oountry, and after the 1951 eleotion it was more obviously 
7 J. Fauvet, La IVe R~ublique, p. 175. 
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a 'Oatholic' party than before. The geographioal distribution of 
the MRP's supporters evidenced aoompression. Of the nineteen 
oonstituencies where the MRP polled more than fifteen percent of the 
votes oast, seven were looated in the area of Brittan;)" and four were 
in the East - and they were all areas in which religious practioe was 
strong among the rural population,. Catholioism does not appear to 
have been the onlJr factor in the strength of the MRP as, for instance, 
the party was stronger in the predominantly non-religious department 
'of 'Jura than in faithful Doubs. The distribution of the isolated 
departments where the MRP remained strong showed that the party had 
beoane neither purely oonfessional nor pureJ,y regional, as the Popular 
Demooratio Party had beoome before the war. Nonetheless the results 
of 17 June showed a dis tinot tendency in this direotion. 
Numerioal viotory by the oentre parties WA.S merely the first round. 
The parties still had to prove themselves capable of using their 
victor,y to aohieve strong and stable government. It was evident 
from the start that agreement between the majority parties would be 
reached only as a result of some difficult to achieve oanpromises. 
In the outaoing Assembly there had been only one workable majority .. 
a oombination of the Third Force parties. 
the Third. Force no longer had a. majority. 
In the new AssembJ,y, 
It was flanked by a 
strong oonservative 'Fourth Force' 0 The parliamentary oonfi~tion 
was no longer tripartite but hexagonal, and the majority parties, ,tb:>ugh 
no less oondemned to hang together for fear of hanging separately, 
found the task infinitely more oomplioated with a parliamentary centre 
of gravity perceptibly further to the Right. itA l' in~rieur de la 
~ / 
ma.jorite, quelque preoaire qu'elle soit, des regroupements et des 
~laoements du centre de gravi t~ se dessinent. 8i les laioisants 
ne sont pas disposes a c&der a' oe nouvel "esprit nouvellt , il y a aussi 
I / 
aux environs dn oentre droit, una resistanoe grandissante aux pretentions 
dirigistes. Le parti radical" de me"me que l' UDSR, est liberal 
economiquement. Si l' on :tient compte en outre des divers groupes 
moa.e:rJs" il est en train de se former un pOle d' attraction" non pas 
reactionna1re mais decid$ment cOll$ervateur. Au mieux, dans ces 
condi tiona" un gouvemement ne peut se maintenir qu 'avec des 
majorit's de rechange, en portant, suivant la formule de Oharles 
Dupuy l' arme tan.t~t sur 1 t epaule gauche et tamtG:t sur II ~paule 
droite .. Il faut pour cela des virtuoses ..... II 8 In the midst 
of this situation moved a reduced MRP, a party whioh, although it 
had less support than it had gained in previous general elections, 
pl~ed a very diffioul t role that was as important, and perhaps even 
more important than was the case before the eleotion. 
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In the Fourth Republic a second pivot party emerged; the MRP, 
which proved as indispensable to every majority as the Radioals.. In 
spite of this vital pesition, however, the MRP's members differed often 
fran their partners on most of the major problems of policy - from 
colonialism to education, and fran foreign policy to the electoral 
system - and in their basic outlook as Oatholics and not as free-
thinkers; moralists and not men of the world; resisters and not 
attentistes, men aware of the social problem\ of the working-olasses, 
whioh the Radicals negleoted. The main internal paradoxes of the 
:MRP were, firstlJr, its hostility to the Third Republio but for many 
of whose trait.s they actuall\Y hankered and, seoondl¥, its favourable 
attitude to the party disoipline they detested. GraduallJr the MRP 
made more and more concessions to its partners and came to abandon, 
eventually, muoh of its orusading zeal. Its members who were least 
willing to oompromise went over to the REF, the Oatholic Lett, or like 
Georges Bidault in 1958, the extreme Right. This, of course, made 
8 Lt Ann~e Politique, 1951 p. X • 
the party more homogeneous but it did also mean that it was going to 
be less able to oompromise beoause it did represent a more olear~ 
detined set ot opinions. The MRP appeared as a typioal oentre 
party, a party which could not break oomplete~ with either the right 
or the lett. It could not accept ~ moditioation ot the prinoiple 
of the social and economio retorm. ot the Liberation without breaking 
with Socialism and opening the w~ to a reoonstitution of the old 
right .. wing bloc. But it was also not sure that it would succeed 
at the same time in making the Socialists accept certain technical 
measures tor the necessary improvement of these reforms, and in 
assuring the Radioals and Moderates that it had not gone too far. 
This was a diffioult situation but one that was deoisive in maintain-
ing politioal stability. The numerioal strength, the dootrinal 
originality and the treshness ot the MRPts programme meant that it 
would remain, for a time at least, one ot the es.ential elements ot 
French politioal lite. 
liThe eleotion results gave the ooalition of the tour oentre groups 
a ma.jori ty. Were this ooalition to have suooeeded in maintaining 
its oohesiveness, the Assemb~ would have produced a strong governing 
majority, opposed b,y two parties large enough to make their views 
prevail. There existed the neoessary oonditions tor the proper 
operation of the parliamentary system. In order to have 
accomplished that, however, the tour parties of the majority would 
have had to have had a oommon govermnental program. The major 
defeot ot the 1951 eleotoral law was that it did nothing to oompel 
these parties to har.monize their points of view and to oome to suoh 
a compromise. The electoral law created among them a solidarity 
that was purely negative, based o~ on their oommon, but temporary, 
electoral interest in defeating both the Gaullists and the Communists. 
Immediately after the eleotion there were good reasons for fearing 
that the new Assenibly would be able to produoe a real governing 
majori ty only with grea.t diffioulty. The fear was SUbstantiated 
41. 
quickly, during the debates of the first sessionwhioh opened on July 5 
and oontinued until September 25, 1951. II 9 
9 Fo Goguel, Franoe Under The Fourth Republio p. 120. 
OHAPTER III 
r 
THE DILEMMA OF THE MRP: 
AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE 1,51· IS~ 
OF STATE AID TO PRIVATE SCHOOLS 
Even the least ideologioal1\1-minded politioian knew that in some 
regions laloite was still the real eleotoral dividing line; here and 
there it was the only politioal problem on whioh voters~ views oorres-
ponded olosely with their party sympathies. Since politics turned 
on several different oonfliots instead of one, however, there was a 
ooherent majority neither in the oountr.Y for a single party nor in 
Parliament for a lBtins ooalition. Assooiates on one issue were not 
unoanmonl.Jr bitter opponents on others. "MRP for example worked with 
Sooialists, Radioals and Oonservati vas in defending the regime against 
Oammuniata and Gaullists. On matters involving working-olass 
interests and sometimes on oolonial questions it sympathized with the 
Sooialists and Oanmunists: Radioals, Oonservatives and (until 1!351) 
RPF were hostile to its views. But over churoh sohools MRP found 
its frienda (or competitors) among Gaullists and Oonservatives, while 
all Socialists and most Radicals joined the Oommunists against it. 
And on Europe it agreed with most Oonservatives and Sooialists and 
opposed Oommunists and RPF, with the Radioals split. So complioated 
a situation put' a high premium on the arts of manoeuvre and faoilitated, 
other temporary combinations." 1 
In 1886 Jules Ferry secularized publio primary education. This 
oame at the end of a long series ot struggles between the Ohureh t in 
alliance with the monarchists, and the republioans. The secular-
1 P. M. Williams, Orisis and Oompromise, p.29. 
ization was seen as a symbolic victory for the republicans, particular13 
as it was self-oonsolidating to a oertain extent beoause the training 
of future oi tizens was being taken away from the influenoe of the Ohuroh. 
The principle that no aid for private schools was to come from publio 
funds soon established itself among the preoepts of those of left-wing 
cpiilion, and this served onq to increase the hostility ot the Ohuroh. 
The tact that the Viohy government had granted subsidies to the 
private sohools naturally enha.noed even further the symbolio signifioanoe 
of the old legislation whioh Vio~ had abrogated andwhioh was restOt~ed 
in 19450 Religiosity and the religiOUS problem varied in importance 
in different parts of Franoeo Nonetheless of the total sohool 
population in France in the earlJr years of the Fourth Republio, thirty 
percent were eduoated in schools entirely unsupported by the state 
(most13 Roman Oatholic schools), While the remaining seventy percent 
reoeived free education in Stateschaiso In the case ot primary 
education in the school year of 1949-50 some 4,220,000 pupils attended 
State sohools as against 910,000 educated at private schools whilst in 
the case of seoandar,y education approximately 412,000 attended State 
schools and 308,500 attended private schools. The largest proportion 
of children attending Ohurch or other private primary schools was to be 
found in Western France, espeoialq Brittan;y, and in the south-eastern 
distriots of the :Massif Oentral, where private sohools accounted for 
over fifty percent of the pupils. It is interesting, however, that 
in some areas, for instance, Lorraine, Francl.l.e..Qomt' and Savoie, less 
than fifteen percent of the ohildren attended private schools, and yet 
religious intensity was higho This showed that, exoept in the few 
areas, where there was a high attendanoe at private schools, the public 
sohools no longer aroused the fears that had been current at the turn of 
the century. The eduoation given in the public sohools was basioalq 
non-religiOUS, but not antireligious. and it did not appear to the 
parents or even to the olergy to be a threat, to the beliefs of the 
children. Otten when this situation arose the reason tor a child 
attending a private school coUla be attributed to social rather than 
religious causeso On the other hand where the private schools were 
well attended, the public schools, born in a belligerent atmosphere, 
otten adopted an aggressive, seoular oharacter. This, of course, 
merel;y served to perpetuate the discord and mutual resentment between 
the partisans of the two factions. In spite of large numbers ot 
children attending private schools in some areas many private schools 
experienced acute finanoial difficulties awing to the increased cost of 
li ving, the deoline in the incomes of the middle and upper olasses, 
higher taxation, end the higher price of school repairs, maintenance 
and equipment. It was disolosed in the National Assembly in 1950 
that man.v teachers in primary private sohools were earning about one.-
third of the salar,y of teachers in State sohools and far less than the 
salaire minimum garanti fixed by law. Since the Loi Falloux of 1850, 
whioh was regarded as ~be • charter' of the free sohools, freedom of 
education was repeatedl3 embodied in the Oonstitutional Acts of the 
French State, alike under the Second Einpire and the Third and Fourth 
Republios, In raising the question of State aid to ohurch sohools 
right at the beginning of the Second Legislature of the Fourth Republic 
the MRP hoped to dispose of one of the major obstaoles that stood in 
the way of a majority, and once past it the majority would be freer in 
its movements. By itself the issue was not suffioient to break the 
'Third Force' but the oharm was broken before the majority was, and 
this happened because of oonflict over the sohools question. 
The.etfeot of attempts to subvert the old privileged position of 
the Ohuroh, whioh reached their peak at the end of the nineteenth 
centur,y was to drive ~ into apposition to the democracy they saw 
being put into practioe end enforoedo The consequenoes of this 
in French poli tioal life remain numerous J a striking example was the 
ilrq>ortanoe that was attaohed to a problem such as that of the private 
sohools. French publio opinion had gradually beoane impressed, under 
the influence of sooialist ideas, with the notion that striotly juridioal 
and. formal liberty would be fallacious unless there were an eoonanio 
basis which would permit liberty to be realized in praotioe. It was 
this prinoiple whioh instigated the reforms oarried out in the sooial 
sphere between the two wars. The Oatholics considered themselves 
jus tified in demanding that this theoretioal liberty (inoluding as it 
did the belief in freedom of eduoation) be made effeotive by appropriate 
finanoial measures, that is, by governmental subsidies whioh would 
permit the private sohools to pay their teachers deoent salaries and not 
require finanoial sacrifices by the parents of their pupils. There 
was also the fact qfthe sharp rise in the birth rate after 194.5 whioh 
was threatening to swamp the existing number of teachers and school 
facilities and to prevent the provision of education for all the ohildren. 
In fact there oould be compulsory eduoation on13 beoause of the existenoe 
of the private schools. The Oatholics therefore reasoned that as 
they were partioipating in the performance of a publio service, they 
should be aided by the State. On another plane, the question of the 
survival of private schools (Of whioh the vast number were Oatholio) 
was of vital importance to the Frenoh Oatholio Ohurch beoause priests 
were reorui ted almost exolusiveJs among the former students of private 
schoolso Oontrar,y to what had happened in 1946, the question of the 
aial, and finanoial, status and condition of the Oatholic schools was 
raised during the campaign for the 19.51 general election by the RPF. 
the Independents, the MRP, and, in two or three departments, the RGR. 
These groups all insisted that the Oatholic schools should be aided by 
public tunds, which after all were contributed to by parents whose 
children were sent to private schools at their own expense. On the 
other hand, the orthodox Radicals and the Socialists deolared their 
fidelity to the traditional idea of the separation of church and state, 
which precluded such subsidies. Natural~ the Oommunists tried to 
exploi t this dissension between allied parties in order to win the 
support of the anti-olerioal voters. 
"From 1947 to 19.51, the Socialists and the Popular Republicans 
oonstituted the largest fraction of the Oenter majority. They had 
had to make serious ooncessions to the RGR and to the Moderates, and 
bore a speoial responsibility because of their numbers. After the 
June election, the great~ increased importanoe of the liberal elements 
of the Oenter seemed to transfer this responsibility to them." 2 
However the coalition was divided and it was only many weeks after the 
election that a Government was invested under M. Ren' Pleven on the 
eiglth of August. The major problems were: the struggle between 
apposing econcmic views .. those of the Moderate and the Radical parties 
which were partisans of laissez-faire capitalism, and the Socialists and 
the MRP, who defended a polioy of oontrol of eoonanic acti vi ty by the 
state and of systematio support of the interests ot the wage earners, 
(the Oommunist views were not a real tactor here except beoause of the 
strength ot the Ocmmunist voting power; but the RPF was a temptation 
tor sane of the Moderates); the other problem was in the religious 
sphere and this was far more serious for the MRP. To the measures 
that the majority of the Assemb~ was to introduce and legislate in 
favour ot free sohools, the MRP had to try to impart just suoh a stamp 
as not to force the SOCialists, passionate detenders of secularism, 
into irreooncilable apposition. The task was not easy t or entire~ 
suocessful, and was oanplioated by the social side of the MRPt s 
Olu:'istian Demooratic views, Which were hard to reoonoile with the 
traditional posit~.on ot a 'Catholio' party; this was the dilemma that 
2 Fo· Goguel, France Under The Fourth Republio, p.122. 
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faced the MRP and which it was impossible to avoid beoo.use of the past 
and the position adopted by the MRP as a 'modern' socialist oriented party. 
"The division of the advocates of subsidies to private sohools 
between the RPF and the Center ooalition made it inevitable that the 
question would quiokly be raised before the National Assemb~. Eaoh 
of the two groups was afraid that the other would try to attract its 
voters by taking the initiative in ohanging the secular sohool laws. 
The fear of each group that it would be outbid by the other oaused the 
sohool question to be raised in Parliament before the Paul-Bono our' 
ocmnittee had arrived at its conclusions. Furthermore~ the faot that 
the Socialists wanted to break WIth their liberal partners in the 
Center ooalition over eoonomio polioy made it oertain~ in advanoe_ that 
they would be unoompromising in their defense of the traditional oon-
oeption of secularism, beoause that would enable them to shift to their 
former allies the responsibility for the dislooation of the majority." 3 
It soon beoame apparent that there was going, to be an impasse over the 
oreation of a Government of the Centre. The Moderates and the MRP 
proposed that the future PreJnier agree not tocppose 8l\Y proposals 
initiated by Parliament for the purpose of giving provisional aid to 
the private schools, pending the Paul-Bonoour oommi ttee report. It 
was hoped by this to make it possible for a proclerical majority in the 
Assembly to settle the school question without dislooating the majority. 
The Sooialists and some of the Radicals, however, made their support of 
M3' Centre government oonditional upon their being free to vote as they 
would. Ma.inl3 beoause of disagreements over the state aid to 
private sohools question M. Relie Ma;yer failed to gain the support of 
an absolute majority of the members of the National Assembly and he had 
to abandon h;1.s attempts to form a government. 14. Maurice Betsohe 
3 Fo Goguel, France Under The Fourth Republio, p. 129. 
was the next to attempt to form a ministry. He presented the sohool 
question as a matter of sooial justice and proposed the establishment 
of a oentral fund to bolster up those professional persons' wages whioh 
were below the guaranteed minilnum. This would have had too many 
extraneous effects, however, and was reoognized by some as being an 
attempt to circumambulate the issue and Petsche too failed to reoeive 
the required mmlber of votes. The Oentre parties were av/are that the 
oontinuing orisis was undermining their position and, consequently, made 
them all the more willing to support the next oandidate for the post of 
Premier, Me Rerie Pleven, who was invested on August 8th without the 
support of the RPF and in face of the opposition of the Contrmwaists. 
He had adopted a moderate approach to the school problem, an approach 
that was almost neutral in appearance. The Socialists, however, 
refused to participate in the Cabinet, although ~ had helped to create 
it. They proposed, onoe the Oabinet wa.s acoepted by Parliament that 
the parliamentar.y session be interrupted until October. But the 
majori ty in favour of aiding the priv8,te sohools refused to acoept this 
and deoided that the Assembly would take up its work again on August 21 
tor a short session to be devoted to the sohool problem. 
"Une attitude intransigante risque de tout remettre en question; 
qu • on le veuille ou non, 1 t aide finanoiere awe itcoles libres est 
a l' heure actuelle la seula id6e oommune awe partis de 18. moi tie droi te 
Cela veut dire que la 
religion appara'it camne le seul oiment possible des forces oonservatrioes. 
Plus exactement : le RP.F et 18. droite olassique utilissent les sentiments 
des oatholiques tran~ais pour faire pression sur le lJlRP atin de 
dissooier 18. l!lAjori te du centre, oe qui revient a tenter de ramener 
au 'beroail oonservateur les oh:rittiens qui 13' en . ~taient echappes et 
d' annihiler taus les prog~s realises depuis oinq an.ne.e Si les 
eleotions oantonales d' Octobre se font sur le t~ de la "ldoite" 
1a SFIO sera rejet'ee vera 1es ocmnunistes, et tout espoir de ooncentration 
disparaitra; 1a droite aura gagn& son grand oombat contre 1es 
I 
I 
repUb1ioains populaires et leur oollaboration avec 1es sooialistes; 
mef-s les oatholiques. qui lui auront seu1ement servi d' otages, auront 
L' inverse 
perte sur 1e plan moral de oe retour Ii 1 ~OO ne sera canpens'e par 
As far as the MRP was concerned 
this oanp1eted the oirc1e of its di1emnaJ if found itself in the 
awkward position whereby as the 'Oatho1io' party it had to support 
SUbsidies for private so~1s, as a 'sooialist-type' party it was split 
(it was a measure that would improve welfare but that would also take 
some authority awa::! from the state). and as the member of the Oentre 
majority that acted as the pivot, (balanoing the Socialists on the one 
hand, and the more conservative parties on the other, with the RPF as a 
disruptive, polarizing factor waiting in the wings) it had the difficult 
job of trying to avoid splitting the majority at the same time as passing 
such legislation as would tide over the demanding pressure groups and 
the other parties until the Paul-Boncour oommittee delivered its report. 
Traditiona1~ the division between Oatho1ios and anti-01erioals had 
a pare11e1 in the division between Right and Left, and there was a 
tradition among the former of opposition to freemasonry and even to the 
RepubUo itself. The Oatholio oontribution to the RElsistanoe went 
far to remove these memories, sanething the MRP ferventlJr hoped for. 
Nonetheless. although the oonflict was muoh less intense then in earlier 
years it was still an important factor in the politics of the Fourth 
Republio. The main issue, in so far as the problem of the private 
sohools was concerned, was not whether parents had the right to send 
their ohildren to private sohools, but whether private sohools should 
4 Le liIonda, selection hebdanadaire, du vendredi 20 au jeudi 
26 jui11et, 1951. 
be subsidized from public funds. No Catholic party oould fall 
behind its rivals on this subject without risking the loss of its 
clerical support and the defeotion of its voters. Pressure groups 
arose with the intent of passing legislation favourable to the private 
sohools. Throughout the west, where a large proportion of the 
Catholio sohool population was conoentrated, the supporters of the 
oause organized an • Association de parents d.' ~leves et de l' "nseigne-
ment libre t, whioh successfully sought binding promises from oandidates 
and ,rather less suocessfully, to determine the local electoral 
alliMOes. Wi thin Parliament the t Association parlementaire pour 
10. libert' de 1" enseigMJllent' organized its 296 pledged supporters to 
vote OnJ3 for those governments whioh accepted their programme. Yet 
not everywhere was this oonsidered a vital issue; in all, over two 
hundred deputies ignored the problem in their election addresses. 
But in those areas of the west and of the Massif Central where the 
Catholios were strong and conservative in their outlook it was an 
issue of vi tal importance and which took precedence over BXJY worry 
of it splitting the Third. Force majority byoausing the Socialists to 
withdraw • 
.As the olergy withdrew from militant opposition to the ~g:ime and 
as political pov/er shifted fran the oountryside to the towns, fewer 
village school teachers regarded themselves as embattled missionaries 
of the Republio. Every year diminished the large fund of 
accumulated mistrust whioh still remained for politioal exploitation, 
and with its decline the two great corporations lost their central 
place in poli tioal organization and oonfliot. However, although 
the teaohers, perhaps the on13 really sucoessful trade union in France, 
might have lost their old intolerant atheism they had not lost their 
favour for 'lai"oi t~ • • In the countryside the eleotoral organization 
of the Socialists and to some extent of the Radicals relied heavi13 on 
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the servioes of the teachers and of the parents' assooiations of the 
state sohool system. The anti-olerioal parties and organizations 
were grouped in a 'Oomit' national de abfense laique' which stood 
alongside intelleotual societies suoh as the 'Ligue des droits de 
l' homme'. Whatever a politioians politioal stanoe he tended to 
depend for support on a restricted sooial and ideologioal olientele, 
and if he tried to extend it he found that the floating vote was not 
a single group in the centre but a series of grouplets in the inter-
stioes between the main parties. Hemhere was there a oentral pool 
of doubtful voters open to every party; only' small areas that would 
be open to the appeals of one or two rivalso Every party olaimed 
to be the best defender of some group interest or seotional ideology. 
For instance, the Oonservative in the west had to prove h:lJnself a 
better defender of property than the RPF, and of churoh sOhools. than 
the :MRP; and yet where social issues predaninated over religion the 
MRP might oompete with the Sooialists rather than the Oonservatives. 
The:MRl?, to its awn regret, tended to appear after the 1951 general 
eleotion, more distinot~ than it did in 1945 and. 194.6, to be a 
religious party as, even though it was still undoubtedl;y able to win 
votes from non-Oatholios, the MRP was still a party whiobwas real~ 
strong on~ in certain limited regions of the country, most of which 
were strong Oatholic areas. 
itA disoiplined party oan withstand pressure better than an 
individual politioian, but it is more vulnerable and more easily' 
tempted in a multi-party system than in a two-party regime where one 
rival hol~ power and responsibility and the other hopes to. A 
majori ty party (actual or potential) dare not identify itself 
exclusively' with one interest for fear of losing the floating vote. 
But in Franoe perpetual ooalitions obscured the responsibility. 
No party, hopeful of a olear majority,would give or withhold power; 
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for the vote did not exist. Instee.d multiple cleavages split the 
nation into several opposing oamps; bO\ll'geois against worker, peasant 
against town.sman, Catholio againa t anti"'olerioal. Between these 
oamps votes shifted rarely, within them frequently, for oanpetition was 
fiercest between rival parties bidding for the same olientele and every 
moderate had to fear a more extreme defender of the Same oause. At 
elections, parties in a permanent minority dared not offend the group 
on which they depended - not for viotory, but for survival. In a 
Parliament with no majority, manoeuvre and obstruction oould often be 
praotised without success." 5 Negotiation was therefore more open, 
exchange of concessions more obvious, and responsibility for making, 
maintaining and. breaking a cabinet easier to locate. While the 
wanton breach of an alliance inourred more disoredit, support was given 
or withheld in large blocks and so adjustments were sudden and not 
always smooth. Just beoause responsibilities were more visible, 
every cabinet orisis gave rise to elaborate manoeuvres to confuse the 
issue and to shift the blame. Suoh actions might have profited an 
individual party, but they almost always harmed the regime. The 
oentralized Republic was weak at the top, and loose parties, 
unmanageable Parliaments and unstable Governments gave every opportunity 
for influence, although the state's 'teohnoorats' often sepped into 
the places of the politioians and kept the oonoessions within reasono 
The weakness of the governing bodies was deplored by publio figures 
of all views as well as by the publio in general who oould see on 
occasion that there was acute sensitivity to forces fran various 
quarters. 
The MRP inherited from its religious fbrebears a spiritualism that 
would have put it on the Right in the classio division of political 
tendenoies. At the same time IIl8!.lY of its Christian Democratic 
5 P. Me Williams, Crisis and Compromise, p. 352. 
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ideM tied it to the Lef't. There was a oonsiderable and constant 
tension between the two orientations .. and the MRP f'ound itself' rather 
ill at ease in either carap. They were one of' the pillars of' the 
regime.. the defenders of the family but they did not oonsti tute a oement 
since no majority oould be oonstituted with them or without them. 
This politioal ambiguity and the unstable politioal position of the MRP 
would appear to have had basically religious oauses. However, mal\Y 
of the speoifio activities of the MRP were f'rankly pragmatio and oould 
in no way be attributed to Oatholic inspiration of the traditional type, 
even though on oooasion the MRP may have used its spiritualist based 
dootrine to justit,y oertain actions. Most people who beoame MRP 
members or who voted MRP did so beoause of religious factors partioularl¥. 
If there had been no 'Frenoh Catholioism' there would not have been a 
MRP; this was espeoially true since the late 1940's when the right .. 
wing elements who had entered the 'MRP as the t least-bad.' party at the 
end of the war found their natural homes wi thin the I~pend.ent and 
Ga.ullist parties. One thing that was obvious was the laok of 
hanogeneity among the many Oatholic groups. Eaoh such group 
embodied many individual desires; re,~ious, moral, social and even 
poli tioal. These groups did not aggregate poli tioal desires 
effioientl¥ beoause they did not oonsider that their prime objeotive. 
The MRP never disguised the fact that it was a Christian Democratio 
party and it was for this reason that when an issue such as the private 
sohools oontroversy arose wherein the question of religionwa8 raised 
the movement had to tread. very carefully so as not to prejudice its 
alrea.d;r narrower spectrum of supporters. The Church, through men 
suoh as the Bishop of Toulouse, backed the MRP strongl¥ in the early 
post-war eleotions, but beoame much more reserved after 1951, partly 
because the heirarcby preferred more oonservative parties, and partl¥ 
because the movement itself wished to attraot non-oatholios and 
gladly pranoted the ft!IW who joined it. But the eleotorate oontinued 
to regard the party as essential13 Oatholio. Thus despite its 
original preference for the Left _ the:MRP found its support ocming 
from the traditionally oonservative strongholds of the Ohurch. 
However the ~) was not to follow in the footsteps of its predeoessor 
the PDP, as, by inoreasing its votes outside its traditional strong-
holds _ it f'oresh.a.dawed the resilienoe it was to show, to its own 
surprise, in 1958. This oan be explained to a oertain extent by 
the nature of the movement's supporters. At the Liberation the MRP 
was a youthful party. Its early oongresses were dominated by men 
in their thirties; in 1946 it had the seoond highest proportion of 
young deputies (after the Oommunists) and in 1951 the highest of all. 
In spite of the gradual disillusionment of many left-wing militants, 
who subsequently left the movement_ and in spite of the fact that 
little new blood was brought in, it was a generation that was repre-
sented by the MRP, 8. generation that had come to reoognize the 
importance of prinoiples, while not negating or denying the position of 
institutions. Disillusioned militants in the MRP were more likely 
to leave the p8l'ty then to remain rebelliously wi thin it. The rank 
and file's soli~lty and devotion to 8. cammon oause enabled ministers 
easi13 to defeat their critiCS, but also preserved the movement fran 
the violent internal clashes so common among its rivals. MRP 
deputies (and especially potential ministers) were alwa,ys more impressed 
than the militants with the advantages of partiCipation in government. 
Their hold on the party was secured not onl3 by its organizational 
structure but also by the increasing weight of its conservative-minded 
eleotorate in the west and north-east; in consequence_ the left wing 
suffered repeated frustrations. During the 1951 "eneral election 
more than 8. quarter of the MRI? deputies had allied themselves with the 
Right or even the ID?F and placed themselves in opposition to the 
Socialists; more widespread alliances with the RPF were prevented only 
by de Gaulle's and the RPF's 1ntransig. 'nce. 
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It ••• The Gaullists in. the .Assembly by no means represented simply 
the defense of privilege of the propertied classes; Gaullism in 1951 
drew m81\Y active supporters from the Radicals, the MRP, and various 
groups in the UDSR, as well as from politioal amateurso It was 
the right wing of the R.PF, not the left, that broke Gaullist disoipline 
to support P:1.na;y; and when the remaining deputies were able to vote 
freely after the General's withdrawal :f'rom politios in 1953, they 
situated themselves in the oenter of the "sooial" speotrum, muoh as the 
UNR did later. 
"The essential grievanoe of ma.l\V of the Assembly's leaders against 
de Gaulle in 19lt-7-53 was precisely that he would be freer from their 
oontrol than they wished. It was the "republio,an~" defense - reflex 
against authority that united the anti-Gaullist forces and allowed the 
RPF to be defined as "extreme right". It would have been truer to 
oall the RPF an antiparliamentarian party of the "sooial center"; ma.n.y 
French observers reoognized this. Yet because de Gaulle wished more 
power than the parties would grant him - albeit within a constitutional 
framework - they engaged in a skillful defensive operation that showed 
the "system" at its best. In constructive forward-looking polioy, 
the Itsystemll was less successful; but in "republican defense" it 
changed the eleotoral system, stabilized the cabinet, shortened 
ministerial orises, and postponed eleotions until the Gaullist tide 
reoeded. "6 Nonetheless, contrary to certain prediotions, the RPF 
did not really try to outdo the proposals of the 'AssociatiQn 
parlementaire pour la libert~ de l' enseignement' in favour of aiding 
private sohools. During the debates, the Gaullist spokesmen tried 
to demonstrate that the educational grants did not oontradiot the 
fundamental principle of the separation of ohurch and state, to whioh 
6 D. :Macrae, Parliament, Parties and Sooiety, p.313. 
they deolared their loyal attachment. It was obvious that they did 
not want to antagonize the left-wing followers of the RPF or to allow 
themselves to be identified during the debate with the old Right and 
the pro-olerioals. Here lay the oruoial difference between the MRP 
and the RPF. No longer gould the 'MRP stand back and act as an 
arbi ter or judge and balance· between the Left and the Right. Even 
the Radioals could aooept the 10i ~Bar.a.qte beoause, in spite of their 
strong secular element ,they were oonservative and therefore the 
oonfliot was less than it might otherwise have been. The other 
parties with links on the Right oould all be oagey, and here the RPF 
was the leader with its attitude of basio belief in the separation of 
Ohurch and. state, but a stated preferenoe to be practioal. This 
attitude tended to avoid the party stepping on anyone's toes. The 
MRP, however, simpliY beoause' it was the 'Oatholic' party and beoause 
of the nature of its eleotorate found itself forced to support the 
bill, and this position was very unoanfortable for a number of MRP 
deputies and adherents. General de Gaulle had shaken the parties 
in 1947, "but the politioians right~ estimated that his impact would 
not be permanent. He won over a few devoted followers, mostly from 
MRP, many time-servers who jumped off his bandwagon as soon as it slowed 
down, and a handful of natural rebels or adventurers seeking a leader 
against the System - but often no happier with Gaullist disoipline than 
with any other. RPF could insist on striot obedienoe (though at the 
cost of defeotions) ao long as it was a large party with hopes of 
reconstruoting the regime. But in 1952 Antoine Piney oaptured the 
sympathies of oonservatives both in Paraliament and the country and when 
de Gaulle' s mass support evaporated the RPF parliamentarians were 
rapi~ absorbed »y the System." 7 
7 P. M. Williems, Orisis and Oompranise, pp. 398-399. 
As the party of the Frenoh Revolution the Radicals stood for values 
and fears deep13 ingrained in the French political psyohology; the 
defenoe of the weak against the powerful, the cult of the little man, 
the mistrust of aristocracies of 'birth and wealth, the demand for 
equality. But the Socialists were cc:mpetitors in the same field, 
and the rise of Oommunism gave more weight to the oonflicts which placed 
the Radicals on the Right than to those which had located them on the 
Left. To Thibaudet Ia1cite had been at the very centre of the 
Radical outlook; but it began to seem out-of-date when even rural 
Radioals feared the Camnunists more than the Ohurch. To preserve 
the traditional electoral alliance with the Socialists most provinoial 
deputies opposed the Barange bill to subSidize the church sohool,; but 
they did so rather half-heartedJJr t avoiding the subjeot when they oould, 
voting as oonstituenoy interests dictated when they had to, and leavulg 
tervent anti-olericalism to .their allies. The Socialists vigorously 
expressed their hostility to the measure and declared that the majority 
would be destroyed. The:MRP on the oontrary considered that the 
whole affair was just an episode and that once the problem was settled 
there would be nothing to stand in the W8:3 of its reaffinning its 
solidarity with the Socia~ists on eoonomio matters, and, particu18x13 
in the :immediate futtlI'e on the question ot the Sooialist sponsored 
sliding wage-soale bill. The struggle was thus waged between parties 
and provinces, olasses and ideologies, as well as between organizationso 
But as the prudenoe of the politicians of the System indicated it was 
far less intense in the Fourth Republio than in the Third and the issue 
was to cool gradual13 as the beneti ts came to be seen in a more 
equanimous light; for instance, it enabled all ohildren to reoeive an 
education as there were enough institutions and teachers operating to 
till the need if they were proper13 employed, and it also meant that 
ocmnunal finances were boosted by the subsid;y that also applied to 
state schools. 
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Bills on the sohools question quickJ,y oame to the f'ore in the new 
Legisla.ture, even though eoonomio and international questions were also 
pressing. Both the R:fF and the parliementary association f'or the 
private schools favoured this development; the f'onner because they 
wished to enoourage a split of' the oabinet ooalition, and the latter 
beoause there was a oiear "pro-olerioalll majority in the new Legislature. 
The parliamentary session started again on August 21; it had been hoped 
that it would last onJ,y about ten d.t\Ys, but aotually it lasted muoh 
longer, as it was not adjourned until September 25. I t was devoted 
almost exolusively to the discussion of' two bills ooncerning private 
eduoation. On .August 17 at its f'irst :full meeting, ~' Pleven·s 
Oabinet approved a Bill prepared by the Minister of' Eduoation (M!. Andr'e 
Marie) whioh, in order to meet in part the demand f'or State aid to Roman 
Oatholio and other private sohools, allocated an additional 850,000,000 
franos f'or state soholarships (bourses nationales), the holders of' whioh 
would be allowed to attend either State or private secondary sOhools. 
The Bill also provided f'or the relaxation of' oontrols hindering the 
building of' new sohools, the expenditure of' 12,000,000,000 f'rancs on 
the building of' new State sohools, and the appointment of 700 new 
teachers and assistant teachers. The debate on the Bill in the 
National Assembly, after being twice postponed as the result of' 
Sooialist andOammunist de~1ng taotios, opened on August 30. This 
Bill was passed on September 4. by 361 votes to 236, the RPF joined the 
MRP, Inaipendsnts, and other government parties who voted in favoUr of 
the Bill, whilst the Sooialist1.\ and Oommunists were joined in oppOSition, 
the Radioals being splito The Bill was promulgated on September 21, 
but not before the Oounoil of' the Republio had taoked on an amendment 
stipulating that all sohools qualifying for State soholarships must 
oonform to certain educational standards laid down by the Government. 
The National Assembly, however, restored the original text when it was 
reread. 
Meanwhile September4.aJso S?M 'the' beginning of the debate on M:.f; Oharles 
Barang~'s Bill on behalf of' the :'PsrJ.iamentary Assooiation for Freedan 
of Eduoation (an organization consisting of some 300 MRP, RPF and other 
deputies of the Right and Oentre). The text of the Bill,after 
referring in its preamble to the great difficulties imposed on publio 
education by the shortage of premises and the poor quality of equipment, 
and on private education by the lack of funds to ensure adequate 
p8iYJllent for teachers, prcwided: that parents should reoeive a state 
allowanoe of 1000 franos a term for each ohild attending a primary sohool; 
that in the oase of ohildren attending a state sohool this sum should 
be paid direot~ into a fund oontrolled by the 100a1 authorities for the 
upkeep, a1 teration, and equipment of sohool buildings ~ that in the 
oase of ohildren attending a private sohool the money should be paid to 
the parents' assooiation responsible for the running of the sohoo1, 
that al1ovl8l1oes for the winter term should be paid before October 15, 
that in oertain oases local authorities should be empowered to make 
grants to private sohools, that the allowances should be financed out 
of an inorease in the Produotion Tax, whioh would be paid into a Speoial 
Treasury Aooount; and that these arrangements should oease to have 
effeot on the oaning into force of the general eduoational refoxm 
legislation that was ourrent~ being oonsidered by the Paul-Bonoour 
Oommission. The authors of the Bill hoped that the opposition of the 
anti-olerioals would be sanewhat diminished because four-fifths of the 
funds expended would go to the publio sohools. But the bill took 
on a symbolio significance for both sides and. in addition, the 
opponents of the bill oont:l.nua113 acted as though the bill would aid 
the private sohools exolusivel3'. ltOn passe ensuite aux explioations 
de vote sur l' ensemble.Me Oharles Lussy (socialiste) a.eo1are: 
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"Les sooialis tes ne sont pas pres d' oublier. " S' adressant au MRP, il 
ajoute: "Vous n'avez pas reoulfe devanti,' 16 risque dtune orise de r~gime. 
I I Oonservez oette responsabilite ••• Vous nous avez donne un exemple de oe 
que peuvent la patience et la tenacit'. Nous ne l' oublirons pas." 
M. Soustelle (R.P.F) oonstate: ''Nos i~es ont fait leur oheroine •• quant 
a la ltrloit"e de l' Etat, elle n' a jamais et' au fond du d.E$bat." 
M. de Menthon (MRP) ~olare: "Les sooialistes c:'IGivent se plier a la. 
loi de la majori t'. " Oitant, 1.1. Binot (sooialiste), il tennine: 
"La· loi va. $"tre Yot'e, le. gouvernement 1 t appliquera. la Republique 
continue. II 
L 'ensemble de la proposition de loi est a.dopt~ par 313 vOix 
oontre 255. tt 8 The Bill was passed on September 10. those 
supporting it oanprisillg 115 Rl?F (out of 120). 76 MRP (out of E57). 
44 Inclependents (out of .54), 36 Action Pays anne (out of 41), 
12 Radioals (out of 75), 9 UDSR (out of 15), 8 ~pendents d'outre-mer 
(out of 9) thf:.3 Franyais ~endents, the 2 RDA, and 8 non-insorits. 
:; 
The opposition consisted of the 106 Sooialists, the 97 Oamnun1sts, and 
the At. Progressistes, 46 of the 75 Radioals and 2 UDSR. In addition 
to all the members of the Goverr.nent, 9 Radicals abstained from the 
vote. On September 21 the Bill was passed in the Oounoil of the 
Republio by 123 votes to 119, with several amenClments. Some of 
these were agreed to by the National Assembl8' when the Bill oame up 
for its second reading later the same day, but the Assembl8' restored 
the original provision on the finanoing of the allocations by an inorease 
in the Produotion Tax, and t'inall8' passed the Bill by 327 votes to 221 (I 
The legislation, whioh did not appl8' to Algeria, was promulgated on 
September 28. 
Mo Lussy accused the :MRP ot' being prepared to sacrifice the 
majori ty for the sake of one of its prinoiples and proceeded to make 
8 Lt~e Politique, 1951, p.221. 
it plain that he f'elt it to be pl8jying with fire, partioula.r13 as the 
RPF had notified the MRP that they could not count on it to vote f'or 
the budget they, in oonju.nction with others of the majority, were 
preparing. M. Soustelle (RPF) observed that the division on the 
Bill bore no relationship to the system of' party alliances which had 
existed at the general eleotion and derided the Government for having 
renounoed "even the prinoiple of Ministerial solidarity", as shown by 
the taot that its members had voted in three different w8iys in the 
divisions during the course of' the debate and had deoided to abstain on 
the final vote; and asserted that it thus demonstrated that its 
majority could not hold together, and in these circumstances could not 
maintain power much longer. 
"Mo de Ikotard (:RGiR) a.iclare, Ie 11 septembre; illes deux projets 
de loi qui viennent 0.' etre adopt~s par des majorites solides et 
presque identiques, marquent la volont~ certainede oette Assemblee 
de ne pas dissooier la justioe soolaire de la justice sooiale." En 
sens inverse, Ie Canite de Detense Lai'que oonstate "qutil o'est 
t~ une majorite pour renier ouvertement Ie principe.de la lai'cit'e 
par la Constitution. ••• La Republique est irremediablement divis6e~ 
I ." ' Le debat soola.ire a f'ait appar8!i.tre une nouvelle rna.jorite de draite. 
Celle-ci remplacera-t-elle lila. majorit$tt? comme le souhaitent RPF et 
quelques moMres, ou, au contra.ire, restera-t-elle uneruajorit~ de 
renoontre '1 Ce n t es t pas It une des moindres oonsequences du vote 
I des lois soolaires. 11 est ~ remarquer cependant que Ithabilite 
de M. Pleven a ~ussi ~ maintenir 18 gouvernement ma1gre Ie.. violenoe 
des d&bats." 9 
9 L' Ann'e Politique, 1951, p.223. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE MRP AND POLITICAL REALrry 
The politioal system of the Fourth Hepublio, whereby authority was 
deoided and delegated ~ by ~, enabled the government of the d~ to 
speak in the name of a majority of whioh it was the living and ohanging 
refleotion. ttL t inoonv~nient o' est que, d' un oabinet i l' autre_ 
il y a de longues p6riodes de vacanoes de pouvoir, pendant lesquelles 
les ministres ne font plus qut ex~dier les affaires oourantes. Slil 
nty avait pas le ~sident de la R'publique, la notion m~e. de 
l' ex~outif s' evanoul:rei t •••• Ce qu' il faudrai t, oe serai t une revis ion 
de la oonoeption ~ de l' ex'outif, eontr~ sans doute mais existant 
par lui-~me et non pas seulement oamne un reflet. La IIIe R~publique 
avait herite du pasEfe oette oonoeption du gouvernement: la IVe l' a 
perdue. Noue avons abouti a un ~gime ou l' autorit'e se n~gooie, 
non pas pour un bail menageant sa digni te, mais au jour le jour, ohf:l£lue 
fois, pour ohaque affaire, pour ohaque mouvement." 1 Suoh a 
situation was obviously easily oapable of deteriorating rapidly to suoh 
an extent that parliamentary government itself oould beoome endangered. 
This, in effeot, was the vital issue of the day. Yet even in the face 
of suoh a potential threat the parties of the centre showed themselves 
to be not onl3r unable, but, oft~ unwilling to bind together as a 
stable ooalition. Their differenoes were frequently spotlighted 
on stages consisting of the most minor issues as well as ~n ones of the 
broadest finanoial and eoonomio import. 
1 L' Ann~e Politique, P. XI. 
The Korean war and its side-effeots 1mmediate~ ended the respite 
fran olU"onio inflation (between ndd-1950 and the end of 1951 retail 
prioes in Paris rose by 328%). The most insistent union demand was 
for a sliding-soale of wages that would go beyond the taoit form of 
a sliding-soale that existed in. the form ot the adjustable government-
fixed minimum wage that 'bad been first set in August 1950 and twice 
raised in 1951. The Government itself, however, was oontran ted with 
finanoial ditficulties, and looked with longing towards the untapped 
sources ot tax revenue in the business t farming and professional 
communitieso . But none of the coalition goverr~ents had either the 
internal oohesion or the oourage to try raising taxes exoept by increas-
ing the taxes whioh were easiest to levy and to oolleot, of whioh the 
indireot taxes were an inoreasing parto Rea.rm.am.ent, in addition to 
being a bone of oontention between the parties of lett and right, 
imposed a serious tinanoial burden on the oountry and also required 
the servioes ot many young me~ The weight ot this burden was 
distributed inequi tous13, and Frenoh labour saw this; it was this unfair 
apportionment of the load that the Socialists wanted to prevent; they 
saw that, although the oondition of all the people was improving in real 
terms, those who had more to'''start with were benefiting more than 
proportionately in oomparison to those who had less. The most 
broadJ,y acoepted olaims ot labour - a modest, steady increase in 
purohasing power, an expanded housing programme, and a less sordid 
allowance for the aged .. would have to wait, and this did not please 
workers. Frenoh publio opinion, beoause of the addition of new 
divisive forces to its many politioal tendenoies, was at this time 
possib~ more confuse~ split and more unstable than it had ever been. 
The oonsequenoes of this fragmentation of opinion were aggravated by the 
substitution in almost every oase of tight~ organized parties for the 
flexible and undisoiplined groups of earlier daJrs. The investment 
programme for the modernization of the Frenoh eoon~ required from 
every sooial group saorifioes whioh were made more acute by the faot that 
they were demanded at a time when. Frenoh resouroes had been oonsiderablY 
depleted by the physioal destruotion of two wars, by the liquidation of 
most of France's old foreign investments, and by the flight of oapital 
due to the depreoiation of the currency. FinallY, the international 
tension foroed Franoe to make deoisive ohoioes and additional sacrifioes 
whioh further aggravated its eoonomio position and made it more difficult 
to maintain a satisfactory balanoe of social foroeso Suoh a 
situation required demooratio institutions oapable of oreating a 
government that would be ooherent, stable and strongo The Frenoh 
politioal tradition,however, was not oonduoive to satisfying these 
requirements. Since demoorao,y emerged in Franoe, the governments 
had been almost always divided, unstable, and weak. The reasons for 
this were varied. First~ there was the Oonstitution itself. 
This had been drawn up by men with too little experienoe and this lead 
to oertain mistakes.e For instanoe, the relationship between the National 
AssemblY and the Oabinet was badly out of balance and the Governnent was 
at the mercy of the AssemblY_ t'Not onl3r was there a general desire 
to keep the executive under oontrol, a desire that worked against some 
of the quite sensible laws and rules of the parliamentary system; there 
was also a general desire to keep oolleagues who had won the prize of 
a ministry fran grORing too big for their boots. And there was a 
desire not to see too muoh power in the hands of any group - for so many 
interests not represented by that group might be in danger." 2 
Seoondly, the eleotoral systems tended to oause disruption and disharmony. 
The systems of 1945 and 1951 both gave exoessive authority to the 
executive ooDm1ttees of the parties; and also the systems allowed party 
militants to work too effeotive~. Nor did the systems force the 
2 No Leites, On the Game of Politios in France, PP. X - XI. 
parties to tone down those things that divided them, when they allied. 
Nor did they prevent pure13 negative allianceso The third problem 
was the chief defect of' Frenoh parliamentary procedure, which was the 
excessive importance conferred on committees, as this resulted in a 
serious l.di1'u;tion of' responsibilities which enabled interest groups to 
intervene ef'f'eotivel3', but disoreetl3', in the preparation of legislation. 
The final obstruotion was the problem of reforming industry. This 
was part of the general problem of restoring effeotive demooracy in 
France through institutional changes as the latter would not suffice 
by themselves, however necessary they were, if the public were not 
persuaded that demOQl'aoy was more than a facadeo 
There also existed a set of political habits, fran whioh rules 
could be deduced, which were often detrimental to the funotioning of' a 
system which was already hampered by its very nature. For instance, 
in the French system 1ltlCWr·. tho Fourth Republio, it was very rare for the 
blame for something going wrong to be imputed to anyb~ or even to any 
grOU,p. In the light of this it was h~ surprising that there was 
a certain lack of faith, on the part of the public, in deputies. 
Frenoh poli tios were not in practioe as liedeviled by ideology as many 
Frenoh intelleotuals chose to believe. French parliamentar,y politics 
were, however, muoh bedeviled by interest groups, and it was these 
pressure groups, as muoh as unbridled personal ambition, that worked to 
produce instability. Often great issues were not debated, and, 
above all, not ,deoided, while issues important to the Assembl3' or to its 
members were debated. The esprit de oorps of the Assembl3' worked 
against the stability of governments, as offices were oontinually 
shuffled around, as though there were resentment that anybody should 
st8iY in office too long; and within the limits of built-in irrespon-
sibility, the politioians oould, of course, disp~ animosity, ambition, 
and ranoour.. Wl thin the Assemb13- cattiness reigned supreme. The 
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results of these political habits were serious and bad. Again and 
again, important decisions were postponed until good solutions were 
impossible. An equally important result of these habits was the great 
diffioult,y of planning and executing long-range designs. Yet, the 
Fourth Republic had much to its credit, notably an astounding economic 
recovery and advance. Many long-term projects were put in hand; 
maqr were successfully completed. Perhaps the politicians deserved 
some oredit, but they could not get it; the evasion of responsibility 
worked both ways. The men who pla\Yed this game were often worthy of 
Pla3ring a different game. They did not get the chance, and nor 
were they able to make that chance possible. 
The fall of France and the VichiY interlude gave elements among 
French Oatholics a new impetus to find a bridge betWeen their faith 
and the needs of contemporary society - particularly that urban indus-
trial SOCiety, for the most part long estranged .fran the Ohuroh. This 
imf!etu~ tooK varied forms ranging from the idea of Oamnunists and 
Catholics working in a movement to better working-olass conditions 
to the idea of oreating a new major party devoted to the Ohurch, but 
defini tely on the Left in its social and eoonomic programme. 
"In some WfqS it was an advantage for the MRP to be classified 
as the 'Oatholio party'; there was a oertain tenacity, devotion to 
dootrine and party loyalty within the MRP that rDB3 have been related 
to the religiOSity of its members. An anti-olerical Radical Socialist 
fran Burgun~ commented that many opponents of the MRP were afraid the 
party would keep its promises. But there is a general political 
disadvantage for the MRP in being identified as the Oatholic party. 
Franoe is Oatholic on the surface, but there are relatively few 
practising Catholios in .France. Anti-clericalism is a strong 
politioal foroe, especial.l\Y in the Radical Socialist and Socialist 
parties (as well as the Oammmist Party, of course). The MRi? had. 
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sought uniqueness by oalling itself' the party of the Fourth Republio, 
but it was given an unsolioitedand unwanted unique position when m~ 
identified it as the Catholio party." 3 Both the MRP and the 
trades union organization, the OFTC, were Catholio, but neither was 
oontrolled by the Hierarol\Y. Two factors differentiated Catholio 
inspiration organizations :fran groups oloser to the Hterarol\Y. 
Firstly, they were distinct fran the Church and from offioially 
mandated Catholic struotures; there were no visible ties with the 
eoolesiastioal nuoleus as suoh, and non-Catholics were weloome in all 
these organizations& Seoond~, they were not restrioted in the 
political role they could p~o In praotice two main prinoiples 
linked these groups with the ohurch; in the first instanoe, the 
majori ty of individual members were in fact Catholios, resolved to 
apply the social dootrine of the Churoh wherever they could, even 
though the organizations in whioh they found themselves were "neutral"; 
and in the seoond instanoe, most members of the MRP and the CFTO had 
a strong desire to stay !tin the family" even when this oould not be 
oonsecrated by an eoolesiastioal mandate. Dootrinal13, their 
oonoeption of sooiety did not favour the ore at ion of an effeotive state 
struoture. The MRP, following the line of thought of oertain Oatholio 
philosophers, felt that the various natural groups of whioh human 
society oons:hts -families, towns, trades or professions, ohurches, 
and so on - all possessed, by natural law, a private area of activity 
in whioh the state should not intervene. Their fear of the enOl"3e.oh-
ments of a Jacobin, omnipotent state prevented them from understanding 
the neoessity for a strong state. They hoped to overoome the 
individualism of the Third Republio by "organizing" democracy through 
the new role oonferred on politioal parties and by oomplioated legal 
3 R. B. Oapelle, The MRP and Frenoh Foreign Policy, p.1,5. 
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meohanisms ... such as the investiture of the Premier prior to the form-
ation of the cabinet, the requirement of a delay before taking the vote 
on notions of oensure or confidence_ and the requirement of special 
majorities for certain decisions. In practice these mechanisms were 
to be unworkable or har.mf~ In the light of these factors, therefore, 
it was hardly surprising that when oonditions beoame unfavourable in &13" 
w~ the MRP lost the leadership of a Oentre that was generally 
weakening. 
Given the fragmented nature of Frenoh politics wherein governments 
and majorities were continually ohanging it was extremely difficult for 
long tenn plans to be either formulated or exeouted.. Often deputies 
were not interested in the general good of Metropolitan Franoe, 
preferring to foster their own personal and regional interests. 
Somewhat surprisinglJr there was no decline in the level of political 
participation on the part of Frenchmen. There was certainly no 
indioation that compulsor,y voting was necessar,y in order to keep up 
a declining political interest. Perhaps in faot this interest was 
heightened by the political situation. "Between the rival advooates 
(the RP.F and the OF) of strong and dvnemio government, the moderate 
groups waged a dogged and persistent struggle for survival. But 
they survived the difficult years, and when in 19lt.9 relative economic 
stability was achieved public support began gradually to swing baok 
from the extreme to the centre parties." 4-
Most of the ministerial crises up to the 1 9.51 elections were 
provoked by the intransigence of the Socialists, IIwho wanted to stop 
the trend toward liberalism in French e oonomio polioy and to defend 
4- P. M. Williams, Frenoh Politiaans and Eleotions, p. 19. 
the interests of the wage earners by procuring for them, in the 
absenoe of lower prices, substantial increases in wages. But the 
Socialist party was never able to achieve its aims. On the contrary, 
eaoh crisis was followed by a reinforcement of the influence of the 
liberals on the majority and on the government. The marginal 
pos:i.tion of the Radicals and the Moderates, who were indispensable for 
the formation of a majority in the National Assembly, gave them an 
irrjsistable bargaining position, especially as part of the MRP was 
aware of the liberal preferences of its electors. The failure of 
the initial conception of the Third Force was reflected in the eoonomic 
and social sphere by the exact opposite of what its promoters would 
have wanted. Not on13 oould no new eoonomic or social reforms be 
oarried out after November 1947, but the working masses were not able 
to tmprove their standard of living in proportion to the oonsiderab1e 
increase in produotiono There was significant eoonomio recover,y, 
aided by the Marshall Plan, and the increased quantities of consumer's 
goods enabled all the Frenoh, even those belonging to the humblest 
classes, to improve their material situation with respeot to the 
poverty of the first pos twar years. But this improvement was 
proportionally muoh greater for the wealthY and the privileged than 
for the great mass of the peopleo That is what the Socialists had 
wanted to prevent, but the politioal situation made them the prisoners 
of the Radicals and of the Moderates beoause they wanted neither to 
leave the Wa:J1 open for the Gau11!sts nor to oome to terms with the 
Oommunists, and were thus left with no effective w~ of making their 
views prevai1o" 5 
To some degree the MRP now found itself in a similar situation • 
.5 F. Gogue1, France Under the Fourth Republio, pp. 44-45. 
The traditi.onal parties had. been slow and reluotant to accept the MRP 
as a political allY or even to admit its right to exist at all. The 
MRP militants who despised and rebelled against the traditional 
Conservatives were tarced into unwilling association with them by the 
reticence ot more desirable partners. This problem was shown at 
its clearest in the disgruntlement felt by many tor the Radical's 
leader, P.iarre Men~s-Franoe, in 1954.-55 when he tried to plSiY the 
progressive, regenerating role in whioh they had onoe cast themselves; 
to reproduoe their former attaoks against a "system" to whioh they now 
belonged; to appeal to the very groups - youth, women, progressive 
Oatholios - whioh they had once hoped to make their own; and beoause 
he attracted a popular enthusiasm and confidence which their own 
leaders had failed to arouse. In e£feot the MRP had lost the 
central,oontrol11ng position it once occupied as the guiding-light 
ot the Third Foroe and it was now reduced to more of an element, 
rather than the oatalYst it onoe was. This occured beoause political 
opinions beoame more alienated tran the oentre groups and the MRP lost 
m~ ot its votes, beooming thereby less ot a movement and more of a 
party. In etfeot, had not the RP.F already passed its zenith it is 
hig~ probable some form of ooalition oould have arisen at this time 
oontaining a Gaullist majority. 
The rightward trend in politios had been high4r probehle, in 
part as reaction to the Oommunist departure tran the government, atter 
the Oentre parties had proved themselves oapehle ot surviving but ot 
little more. . ItThe new Ass:embly (ot 1951) showed little disposition 
to tackle the problems of eoonomio programming or Franoe's international 
position. In vain did ohronio budgetary detioits tocus the need 
for fundamental retorms. The Pleven government tell because the 
Assembly would not give it the authority to lessen expenditure [a thing 
abhorrent to the Socialist~l, the Faure government tell beoause the 
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Assernb13r would not let it raise more money in taxes. With the 
Sooialists settled in the opposition, the only ohange possible was to 
move somewhat further to the right in making up a oabinet." 6 
In Deoember 1951 the Pleven ministry won its solitary triumph when the 
Assemb13r ratified by a large and unexpeoted major:!. ty the Sohuman Plan 
for a European ooal and steel oommuni ty. But: i its own supporters 
were. no longer reliable. The MRP joined the three opposition 
parties in passing the sliding-scale bill. The Radioals and the 
Oonservatives attacked Robert Sohuman for attempting to oonoiliate 
the Tunisian nationalists. Renk MaJrer, the minister of finanoe, was 
a targe~ for the Peasant group of right-wing Oonservativeso Final13r 
the budget, whioh oalled for speoial powers to reorganize the sooial 
servioes and nationalized ra.ilw88"s, drove the Sooialists into 
opposition and they defeated the oabinet in January 1952. The new 
premier was Edgar Faure, a young Radioal leader, who tried to win them 
back by ooncessions over Europe and Tunisia, the budget and the sliding-
soale bill; the Oonservatives and ma.t\Y of his own party revolted, and 
on proposing higher taxes he was beaten on a vote of oonfidenoe at the 
end of February. A Oonservative, Antoine Piney, was nominated. 
His expeoted failure was meant to show these rebels that there was no 
right-wing alternative to the old majority and that they must therefore 
make the necessary ooncessions, But to the general astonishment he 
aOhieved the impossible. 'Z7 Gaullist deputies defied their whip to 
vote him into the premiership at the head of the most oonservative 
majori ty Franoe had known for twenty years. Aided by a world-wide 
fall in prioes Piney suooeeded in oheoking inflation (and expansion), 
restoring oonfidenoe and winning a great popular reputation, 
6 V. He Lorwin, The Frenoh Labor Movement, p. 138. 
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Inevi tablJr this provoked parliamentary jealousy. But not until the 
end of 19.52 did the Radioals and the MRP feel it sake to overthrow him; 
the former with their usual skill manoeuvring the latter into taking 
the blame. Thus it was that the swing to the right oooured. To 
a certain degree it was a natural outoome of a basioallJr oonse~r.ative 
oountry that had a tendency to vote simplJr for the party list whioh, 
in the individual's mind, stood for the partioular prinoiples to whioh 
he was attracted: for freedom of business interests, for anti-
olericalism, for sooialistio Oatholioism, for Republioianism, for the 
defence of the interests of the workers, as the oase might be. 
That a swing to the right might arise out of what was basioallJr a left 
of oentre governing group was more possible than a swing to the left 
is not surprising as the groups to the left were traditionallJr highlJr 
organized and the degree of the strength and the opinions of their 
members and supporters were well known; whereas to the right party 
struotures were muoh less developed and programmes less olearlJr 
defined - after all one of the major threats the right used against 
the left was that of the disbandment of politioal parties, something 
that would effeotively cripple the left but not the more fluid right. 
In the midst of this struggle were the parties of the centre, and, 
onoe the initiative slipped from their hands and when their oohesion 
weakened as a result of the Ohuroh-sohools question, it was they who 
suffered the most as, even though at future eleotions they might reoeive 
approximately the same proportion of the votes oast that they reoeived 
during the 19.51 election, they were no longer regarded as the hope for 
not onlJr politioal stability but also for sooial and eoonomio success 
that they once had been. The MRP was unable to solve the problem of 
whether it should be a voioe or an eoho. This dilemma was 
particularly poignant in the oase of the MRP as its ohoioe and its 
range of options was severelJr restrioted and it found itself obliged 
to step down from its position as leader and assume a more obsoure 
and less creative role. 
..... 
The Fourth Republio had, as well as its weaknesses, strengths. 
There were elements of stability' behind the politioal instabilit.Y 
whioh should not be ignored. For the first ten years after the 
Liberation, up to the summer of 19.54, the Quai d' Orsa;y was praotioally 
monopolized by two ministers, Georges Bidault and Robert Sohuman, both 
belonging to the same party, the MRP. The re-shaping of the Frenoh 
eoon~ was largely free from the vagaries of party politios. It 
was entrusted to a oommission inspired and headed by the brilliant 
teohnocrat, Jean Monnet. If the politioal and finanoial weaknesses 
of the Fourth Republio are often stressed, it is only fair also to 
give oredit to its positive aohievements. These were partioularly 
in the fields of foreign and eoonomio polioyo 
The politioal stage was not so heartening, however, and it was 
littered with a large number of properties, some more ~portant than 
others. Nonethe leas, ea.oh oamp was afraid of exploiting temporary 
advantages, as it might thereby needless~ provoke a later disastrous 
oounter-offensive. Thus the slight parliamentary majority in 
favour of Catholio sohools whioh resulted from the eleotion of 19.51 
did not go beyond gr&lting a quite limited subsidy to these sohools 
I in the so-oalled Loi Barange of that year. The equal~ slight 
majority hostile to Catholio sohools whioh resulted from the eleotions 
of 19.56 also refrained from abrogating that law. In the oampaigns 
preoeding both these general eleotiollS, the problem of sta.te subsidies 
to Oatholio sohools - the only major outstanding problem in the 
relations between Church and State - plB3ed but a minor role, thanks 
to mutual ratrainto In order to survive, governments tended to 
proclaim their neutrality when this question came up before parliament. 
The almost traditional situation of one oris is - one solution - one 
government was not as yet broken and the reason for this la;y in the 
politioal system and in the politioal parties. Suoh a diversity of 
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opinion was permitted, and even apparentement did not require allied 
parties to adopt a oommon platform. ThUS government by oompromise, or 
even by deliberately: avoiding issues so that a oabinet would not be 
split, beoame the rule of the ~. Once again France had been 
unable to find the system and the stable and strong government that 
she needed during the diffioult years that then prevailed. The 
nation almost seemed to prefer a state of semi-anarchy to an ordered 
and, possibly, more restriotive syst~ In a sense measures such 
as the 1951 eleotoral lawvere a vacoineagainst suoh a situation ever 
arising. But it was not a real solution in the long run. 
liThe MRP has professed to be a politioal movement serving all 
groups in the Frenoh nation, and has maintained that, in contrast with 
other Frenoh politioal parties, it is not a "class" party. But its 
geographical oentres of strength are so limited that it would be 
difficult for the MRP to maintain any peeper contact with all groups 
in France. As for freedom from olass allegiance, the party appears 
on the contrary to be primarily confined to a social mileu that might 
best be desoribed as that portion of Frenoh lower middle-class oomposed 
of praotising Oatholics. This milieu. is to be found primarily in the 
rural areas.... The MRP is not conservative enough in political and 
eoonomio matters to satisfy most of the upper class or the grande 
bourgeoisie ( ••• ) in the oi ties, mos t of whom are olosely connected 
with businesso On the other hand, the'MRP is too oonservative to 
draw the bulk of its support from the lower class. Nevertheless, 
Fran~ois Goguei oredited the party with having as much support from 
labor in 19.54 as the Sooialists had or as the RPF of de Gaulle had 
at the peak of its oareer. He also noted, however, that the MRPwas 
moving towards oonservatism and had in general replaced, in its local 
strongholds, the moderate or oonservative parties of the Third Republio. 
A student of Oatholio parties in Europe has declared that "Oatholicism 
and oonservatism are expressions Of an identical oommuni ty type", 
and this seems to hold true as well for the Ohristian-democratic wing 
of Oatholioismo The Ohristian~demooratic vote haa general~ gr~vn 
at the expense of the conservative parties. It 7 Nonetheless eaoh 
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party represented, on average, a reasonable oross-seotion of the 
oommunity, some, obvious~, more than others, but natura1~ there was 
an element within each party that was stronger than the other elements -
for instance within the MRP it was the group of people who oould be 
reasonab~ described as that portion of the Frenoh lower middle-olass 
oomposed of practising Oatholios and inhabiting primari~ rural areas 
that provided the mainstay of the party. The oombination of a large 
oross-section of the oommunity and of one group within this predominating 
meant that it was easy for internal division to ooeur within;IA party 
as a result of the oonfliot of interests. This enigmatio situation 
was oanpounded by the fact that most parties were surrounded by 
political groups that oould provide reasonab~ attraotive alternatives 
for a disillusioned follower. Thus it was that in the meantime an 
obscure poli tioal oondi tion was not to be olarified in spite of, and 
perhaps beoause of, an apparent~ high interest on the part of the 
people in the political soene. 
7 R. B. Oapelle, The MRP and French Foreign Polioy, pp.13-14. 





